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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court decided the question of em-
ployer liability for actionable sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.1 The Court stated that the question must be answered by
I The question was dealt with in a pair of companion cases. See Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). See
also infra Part II.A.
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reference to general agency principles of vicarious liability.2 Under such princi-
ples, an employer is usually liable only if the employee is acting within the
scope of employment in committing the tort.3 The most commonly cited test for
the scope of employment asks whether the employee was "actuated by a purpose
to serve" the employer in committing the tort.4 Because harassers act only to
serve their own nefarious ends, harassment is not within the scope of employ-
ment.5 Fortunately, an obscure provision of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, when read a certain way, provides a separate ground for employer li-
ability whenever the tortfeasor was "aided by the employment relationship" in
committing the tort, even if the tort was not within the scope of employment.6
The Court relied on this provision to find that vicarious liability existed in some
sexual harassment cases.7 Nevertheless, the Court was unwilling to impose
"automatic" liability on employers.8 If automatic liability means strict liability,
in the sense of liability without fault, then vicarious liability is by definition
automatic. 9 The Court avoided this "automatic" result by creating an affirmative
defense which effectively permits an employer to escape vicarious liability in
some situations based on the fact that she has exercised due care.' This is not,
of course, the usual sort of vicarious liability, which clearly applies no matter
how careful the principal has been.
The Court's decisions have been widely criticized as being too pro-
employer and too pro-employee, which perhaps indicates that they struck the
appropriate political balance." The decisions are also, however, bad applica-
tions of imperfectly understood legal rules. It is unlikely that the Court's deci-
2 Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 777.
3 Id. at 755-56 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958)).
4 Id. at 756-57.
5 Id. at 757.
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
7 Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 743-45.
8 Id. at 745.
9 The Court's mandate to apply agency principles without creating automatic liability thus
made no sense. If, on the other hand, automatic liability means liability without any factual
inquiry into whether or not the harassment was within the scope of employment or aided by the
agency relationship, then correct application of agency principles would be unlikely to result in
automatic liability.
10 Id. at 765. In this Article, the principal or employer is referred to as "she," while agents
and employees are referred to as "he." This convention not only provides clarity for pronouns
and antecedents, but also recognizes that sexual harassers (the employees at issue here) are
usually men.
It See Edward Felsenthal, Rulings Open Way for Sex-Harass Cases, WALL ST. J., June 29,
1998, at A3; Anita K. Blair, Harassment Law: More Confused Than Ever, WALL ST. J., July 8,
1998, at A14; Joan Biskupic, This Term, Supreme Court Ruled to the Nation's Beat, WASH.
POST, June 28, 1998, at Al.
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sions will be overruled on that ground, but it is important to identify the errors in
their vicarious liability analysis because state courts, which should have more
familiarity with agency principles, are now borrowing vicarious liability analy-
sis from the Supreme Court and lower Federal court cases.12 This will result not
only in the denial of recovery to those who would, under an appropriate analy-
sis, be compensated, but also in the failure of employers to pay all the appropri-
ate costs of their businesses. On a larger scale, if other courts begin taking the
Supreme Court's "agency law" analysis seriously, a single instance of doctrinal
confusion may eventually destroy a complex and carefully crafted body of law.
Before one can understand employer liability for sexual harassment, one
must understand the vicarious liability doctrine generally. Vicarious liability is
one doctrine among several in agency law intended to coordinate the costs,
risks, and losses of a business with its benefits, advantages, and profits.' 3 The
particular requirements of vicarious liability, such as the independent contractor
exception and the scope of employment limitation, are designed to ensure that
vicarious liability applies in such a way as to achieve that larger goal. Thus,
specific questions about those doctrines, such as what test should be used to
determine whether a tort is within the scope of employment, can be answered by
reference to the broader principles and purposes of agency law.
Because vicarious liability, like most of agency law, asks whether a risk
is inherent in the business, applying the doctrine requires some understanding of
the causes of particular risks. Courts recognize this when they ask, for example,
about the cause of the dispute in battery cases. It is equally necessary to inquire
into the cause of the risk when the tort is sexual harassment. Once one does so,
one discovers that the socio-psychological evidence indicates that harassment is
not, in fact, generated by a mere desire to have sex or to entertain oneself with
pictures of nude women. The precipitating causes of sexual harassment appear
to be a psychological predilection on the part of the harasser combined with
certain identifiable features of the workplace environment.1 4 This, then, is the
factual background in which the appropriate legal rules must be applied. Not
surprisingly, the resulting analysis would hold employers liable when their busi-
nesses increase the risk of the occurrence of the tort; it would be applied on an
appropriately case-by-case basis, as is all vicarious liability analysis; and it
would ensure that vicarious liability rules are applied in a coherent way so as to
advance the general policies of agency law. Alas, the Supreme Court's analysis
accomplishes none of these things.
This Article begins with a brief explication of agency law, including the
rules and principles according to which principals are held liable for their
agent's acts generally and for their servant's torts particularly. In the process, it
12 See, e.g., Bank One, Kentucky, N.A. v. Murphy, 52 S.W.3d 540, 543-45 (Ky. 2001); Parker
v. Warren County Util. Dist., 2 S.W.3d 170, 171 (Tenn. 1999). See also infra Part III.B.
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Part IV.A.
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provides an in-depth exploration of the purposes of vicarious liability and an
analysis of the varying tests used in applying the scope of employment limita-
tion. Part HI provides an analysis and critique of the Supreme Court's 1998 rul-
ings on employer liability for sexual harassment. Part IV first explores the na-
ture of sexual harassment as a workplace risk and then concludes, finally, with
the correct application of vicarious liability doctrine to sexual harassment.
II. THE LAW OF VICARIOuS LIABILITY
A. Agency Law Generally
The history of agency law generally, and vicarious liability specifically,
has not been subjected to extensive study, and until such study has been under-
taken, the origins of vicarious liability will remain somewhat obscure. 5 As a
modem body of law, however, agency is based in commercial convenience, If
individuals did not have the power to act through agents, commerce, industry,
and all the economic trappings of modem life would disappear. By regularizing
the use of agents, the law enables enterprising individuals to carry out their
businesses with greater certainty and fewer transaction costs. The law does this
largely by imputing things, such as the agent's acts and state of mind, to the
principal. Nineteenth-century law conceptualized that imputation through the
identification doctrine, pursuant to which the principal and agent were identified
as one person. The agent was treated essentially as an appendage of the princi-
pal; acting through an agent was the equivalent of using one's own hand. 16 The
identification doctrine, frequently expressed in the maxim qui facit per alium
facit per se, 17 solved a number of problems in agency law because it allowed the
15 The modem doctrine of vicarious liability is sometimes said to have been created by
Chief Justice Holt. See J. DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE LLC: THE LAW OF
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 142 (5th ed. 1998); THOMAS BATY, VICARIOUS
LIABILITY 25-26 (1916); John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History - 11, 7
HARv. L. REV. 383, 394-96 (1894). But see John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts:
Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 330-36 (1894) (discussing the doctrine's origins in Germanic
law). Alternatively, it is sometimes said to descend from the fact that, in Roman times, the
paterfamilias, as owner of the corpus of the family's property, ultimately bore the financial
responsibility for acts done by those under his patria potestas, such as his slaves and his sons.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958); David Johnston, Limiting Liabil-
ity: Roman Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1515, 1524-25 (1995). See
also 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 288 (George E. Woodbine ed., Sam-
uel E. Thorne trans., 1968), available at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/bracton-
/Unframed/English/v2/288.htm ("[A]n obligation is acquired [for us] . . . [b]y free men and the
bondsmen of others in two cases [only], ex operis suis or ex re possessoris.").
16 Holmes compared the simplest agency relationship to that in which a messenger is sent to
conclude a transaction. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARV. L. REv. 345, 347-348
(1891).
17 The maxim translates as "[he] who acts through another acts himself." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1124 (5th ed. 1979).
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agent's state of mind, as well as his actions, to be imputed to the principal. The
identification doctrine is now largely ignored, except as an historical artifact,
and there is no generally accepted grand theory of agency law.
As I argue below, however, one of the fundamental principles of agency
law generally, and of vicarious liability in particular, is that all the incidents of
business ownership belong to the principal, and that those incidents include
risks, liabilities, and other losses as well as opportunities, profits, and other as-
sets. Various doctrines of agency law (and, to some degree, the doctrines of
partnership and corporate law which derive therefrom) embody and apply that
principle, but for the purposes of responsibility for sexual harassment, this Arti-
cle focuses on only those doctrines relating to the principal's liability for an
agent's contracts and torts. A careful examination of the law in this area reveals
the underlying agency law principle at work.
B. Principal's Liability for Agent's Contracts
Although liability for sexual harassment is a question of the principal's
liability for her agent's torts, it is useful to examine the principal's liability in
contract for purposes of comparison, and to illustrate the principles underlying
the principal's liability for all her agent's acts.
1. Authority
Under agency law generally,1 8 a principal is liable for contracts entered
into by an agent on the principal's behalf if the agent was authorized to enter
into the contract.' 9 Authority can arise in several ways, and an agent can have
the power to enter into contracts on his principal's behalf in some cases even
without authority. Authority is based on the principal's manifestation of consent
that the agent do an act on the principal's behalf. Actual authority is based on
the principal's manifestations to the agent,2° whereas apparent authority is based
on her manifestations to a third party. 21 Thus, where a principal instructs an
agent to purchase supplies on her behalf, she has created actual authority for the
agent to do so. Where the principal contacts the vendor to tell the vendor that the
agent will be coming, the principal has created apparent authority. The manifes-
tations must be made by the principal; an agent's assertion to a third party that
the agent is authorized will not, without more, create apparent authority in the
agent. 22 Apparent authority, like actual authority, is based on the principal's
18 A principal may also be liable for her agent's contracts on non-agency grounds such as
restitution or estoppel.
19 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1958).
20 See id. § 7.
21 See id. § 8 cmt. a (1958).
22 The manifestations can, however, be made on the principal's behalf by an agent who is
authorized to do so.
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consent to be bound by the agent's acts.23 Thus, the principal's liability is essen-
tially contractual. 24
2. Estoppel
The principal can also be bound by an agent's contracts as a result of es-
toppel.25 Estoppel applies where the principal knows or should know that a third
party believes that the agent is authorized and the principal fails to take reason-
able steps to correct the third party's belief. 26 If the third party changes her posi-
tion, the principal is estopped from denying the agent's authority. The third
party is only entitled to recover her actual damages, not to enforce the contract.27
The principal's liability by estoppel is thus based on tort concepts of compensa-
tion for loss caused by fault.
28
3. Inherent Agency Power
Even where there is no authority or estoppel, a principal can sometimes
be bound by her agent's contracts made with "inherent agency power," which
subjects the principal to liability for
acts done on [her] account which usually accompany or are in-
cidental to transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct
if, although they are forbidden by the principal, the other party
reasonably believes that the agent is authorized to do them and
has no notice that he is not so authorized.29
Inherent agency power is derived "solely from the agency relation" and
is not based on contract, tort, or restitutionary principles. 30 Rather, it exists be-
cause, "in view of the relations of the parties or the subject matter involved,
policy requires that the agent should have power to bind the principal.",31 Be-
cause inherent agency power has no theoretical basis in tort or contract, it illus-
23 The consent is evidenced by the principal's manifestations to the agent or third party;
thus, consent is sometimes implied from the principal's actions, such as giving the agent a title.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. b (1958).
24 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. d (1958).
25 See id. § 8B.
26 See id. § 8B (1).
27 See id. § 8B cmt. b.
28 See id..
29 Id. § 161.
30 See id. § 8A & cmt. a.
31 Id. § 140 cmt. a.
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trates most clearly the fundamental principles of agency as an independent body
of law. Inherent agency power is based on the notion that "[i]t would be unfair
for an enterprise to have the benefit of the work of its agents without making it
responsible to some extent for their excesses and failures to act carefully. 32
Although the direct beneficiary of the inherent agency power rule is the third
party injured by or dealing with an unauthorized agent, the indirect beneficiaries
are the business world and employers as a class; that is, those who rely on the
use of agents, and the willingness of others to deal with them, to conduct busi-
ness.33 While the term "inherent agency power" is used most frequently when a
third party is seeking to bind the principal in contract, the Restatement (Second)
of Agency describes the principal's vicarious liability for an agent's torts as a
variety of inherent agency power because "the liability rests solely on the rela-
tion"; it is not based on tort principles.34 As the Restatement explicitly states,
if one appoints an agent to conduct a series of transactions over
a period of time, it is fair that [she] should bear losses which are
incurred when such an agent, although without authority to do
so, does something which is usually done in connection with the
transactions he is employed to conduct. Such agents can prop-
erly be regarded as part of the principal's organization in much
the same way as a servant is normally part of the master's busi-
ness enterprise .... In the case of the master, it is thought fair
that one who benefits from the enterprise and has a right to con-
trol the physical activities of those who make the enterprise
profitable, should pay for the physical harm resulting from the
errors and derelictions of the servants while doing the kind of
thing which makes the enterprise successful.35
Inherent agency power is a somewhat controversial doctrine, and some
commentators refuse to accept it as a basis for a principal's contract liability.36
Nevertheless, it is occasionally used to bind principals in contract where appar-
ent authority or estoppel are not available. 37 The tentative draft of the Restate-
32 Id. § 8A cmt. a.
33 Id.; See also id. § 161 cmt. a; Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 239 F. 405, 408 (S.D.N.Y.
1917) ("The very purpose of delegated authority is to avoid constant recourse by third persons
to the principal, which would be a corollary of denying the agent any latitude beyond his exact
instructions .... [T]he very purpose of the relation demands the possibility of the principal's
being bound through the agent's minor deviations.").
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A cmt. b (1958).
35 Id. § 161 cmt. a.
36 See generally HYNES, supra note 15, at 331-32, 333-34.
37 Recent cases applying the concept include Cange v. Stotler and Co., Inc., 826 F.2d 581,
590-91 (7th Cir. 1987); Family Partners Worldwide, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, Atlanta, 530 S.E.2d
742, 744 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206, 1212 (Ind.
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ment (Third) of Agency eliminates the term but purports to retain the liability it
creates by subsuming it into apparent authority and other doctrines.38 To the
extent the basic agency principles underlying the concept of inherent agency
power are the same as those underlying vicarious tort liability, it will continue to
be a useful concept.
4. Ratification
Finally, the principal will be liable if she ratifies her agent's contract.
39
As the Restatement makes clear, the concept of ratification is unique in the law
and derives from necessity "in the prosecution of business," because, by allow-
ing principals to correct technical defects in an agent's authority, it enhances the
predictability and stability of contracts and prevents unnecessary lawsuits.4
These doctrines illustrate that the basic goal of agency law is regulariz-
ing business transactions which underlies the principal's liability for her agent's
contracts. In the ordinary case, a person employing, and likewise transacting,
with an agent, intends the principal, not the agent, to be bound.41 The agent's
ability to perform the contract is thus a matter of no importance to the third
party. 42 If the rules governing creation of authority are narrow, persons contract-
ing with agents will incur costs in verifying either the existence of authority or
the agent's ability to perform in the event the agent is not authorized and the
principal is not bound. If the rules governing creation of authority are broad,
however, third parties will contract with agents more freely but principals will
incur costs monitoring their agents or taking other steps to ensure that limits on
the agents' authority, especially unusual limits, are known to contracting third
parties. The doctrines of apparent authority, estoppel, and inherent agency
power, each of which tests the reasonableness of the parties' behavior in the
context of the transaction in question, seek an appropriate balance for the
breadth of the principal's liability for her agent's contracts in normal business
2000); Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1304 (Ind. 1998); Grosberg v. Mich.
Nat'l Bank-Oakland, 362 N.W.2d 715, 716 n.3 (Mich. 1984); Kahn v. Royal Banks of Mo., 790
S.W.2d 503, 508-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
38 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, ch. 2, introductory cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2001). Because apparent authority and inherent agency power have different theoretical bases,
this change must entail a change in the understanding of one of those concepts. For a good
discussion of the inherent agency power concept, see Kornelia Dormire, Comment, Interent
Agency Power, A Modest Proposal for the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 5 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 243 (2001).
39 A principal may also ratify a tort. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 (1958).
40 See id. § 82 cmt. d.
41 See id. ch. 6: Liability of Principle to Third Persons, Contracts, and Conveyances; Topic
2: Disclosed or Partially Disclosed Principal; Title A: Creation of Liability by Authorized Acts,
introductory cmt.
42 See id.
2002]
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43practice.
On a more theoretical level, the fundamental premise that contracts are
based on consent, however artificial, is carried through in the agency doctrines
governing a principal's liability for her agent's contracts.44 To be liable, the
principal must manifest her consent to be bound by her agent's contracts (either
to the agent or to the third party), or she must subsequently consent to be bound
through ratification. Such doctrines thus satisfy the consensual requirement of
contract theory while satisfying the needs of business by giving legal force to
"normal" modes of transacting. The theoretical and practical foundations of the
principal's liability in tort are completely different, and the doctrines of apparent
authority and estoppel, which are rooted in the expectations of persons dealing
with agents, have only a very limited role in the principal's vicarious tort liabil-
ity.4
5
5. Apparent Authority and Tort Liability
For apparent authority to exist, the third party must reasonably believe
the agent to be authorized. 46 The principal will be liable in tort based on her
agent's apparent authority only when the third party's reasonable belief as to the
agent's authority enabled the agent to commit the tort. The Restatement limits
these situations to what might be called "speech torts," that is, torts in which the
harm arises from the presumed identity of the principal as the speaker. Such acts
include misrepresentation, which depends on the agent's power to enter into the
fraudulently induced contract; defamation, where the harm depends on the exis-
tence of the principal as the supposed speaker (such as where the credibility of
the statement is based on the principal's supposed knowledge); and personal
injury, but only where the agent's apparently authorized representations caused
the harm (such as where the agent falsely tells a visitor that a portion of the
principal's premises are safe).47 An agent who is "apparently authorized" to
drive across town in the company truck does not thereby subject his principal to
liability when he runs someone down in the street.48 First, apparent authority
would not exist in such a case because the victim cannot be said to have relied
43 See id. (discussing the "normal inferences" of actors in various types of transactions).
44 See id. § 161 cmt. a.
45 An early critic of vicarious liability argued that the supposed origin of the rule that a
master is liable for her servant's torts, the case of Jones v. Hart, 90 E.R. 1255 (K.B. 1698),
actually involved contract liability and so should not have been treated as establishing the rule
of vicarious tort liability at all. See BATY, supra note 15, at 24-25.
46 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. c (1958).
47 See id. §§ 265-67.
48 Of course, the principal might be liable based on other vicarious liability rules, as de-
scribed below.
526 [Vol. 104
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upon the principal's manifestations in crossing the street.49 Second, a principal's
manifestations of consent are irrelevant in creating tort liability, which is not
based on consent to be liable.50 Third, the law's goal in creating a principal's
liability for contracts, regularizing business transactions based on the reasonable
expectations of the parties, which underlies apparent authority, is not advanced
by imposing liability on a principal for her agent's torts based on apparent au-
thority (although, as I argue below, it is advanced by other vicarious liability
doctrines). Finally, even if it were theoretically consistent with agency princi-
ples to base a principal's liability in tort on apparent authority, the law simply
does not do So.
5 1
C. Principal's Liability for Agent's Torts
As described further below, a principal is liable for an agent's torts if
the agent is a "servant" and if the agent was acting in the scope of employment
in committing the tort. Because the master's liability is not based on fault, the
master's vicarious liability is sometimes regarded as anomalous in the law of
torts. Commentators have therefore tried to justify the existence of vicarious
liability using the social, economic, and moral justifications used for the law of
torts generally.52 As I argue below, however, the law of torts fails to provide an
adequate explanation for vicarious liability because it is not a tort law doctrine.
49 There are cases in which the victim's reasonable reliance on the appearance of a mas-
ter/servant relationship is permitted to create tort liability on the master despite the fact that
there was no such relationship, but such cases are based on an apparent relationship, not the
creation of apparent authority. See supra Part II.B.5.
50 Rather, a principal's liability in tort for authorized acts by an agent is based on the rule
that "one is liable for what he intentionally causes." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A
cmt. a (1958). Cf. Primeaux v. United States, 181 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 1999) (discussing
apparent authority as a completely separate basis for vicarious liability).
51 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 265 cmt. b (1958); FLOYD R. MECHEM, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 1885 (2d ed. 1914).
52 See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious
Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1740-49 (1996) (lamenting lack of vicarious liability mate-
rial in tort casebooks and inattention to vicarious liability by tort law scholars); Steven P.
Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of Employee Reasonableness, 69
S. CAL. L. REV. 1705, 1706-11 (1996) (discussing loss-spreading and deterrence as rationales
for vicarious liability); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicari-
ous Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1994)
(discussing vicarious liability in light of tort policies); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, A Jurispru-
dential Approach to Common Law Legal Analysis, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 269, 295-96 (1999)
(discussing loss-spreading, deterrence and compensation as rationales for vicarious liability);
Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1234-36, 1240-41,
1244, 1246 (1984) (discussing economic explanations for loss-spreading, compensation, and
deterrence policies).
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1. Direct Liability Distinguished
The master's vicarious liability for the servant's torts must be distin-
guished from the master's direct liability for her own torts.53 Like anyone else, a
master is subject to tort liability for negligent acts, including negligently hiring
an incompetent or dishonest servant, negligently entrusting a dangerous instru-
mentality to another, negligently supervising a servant, and causing or adopting
the tortious act of another.54 Thus, if a master directs her servant to commit a
tort, the master will be directly liable for the tort based on her own act.55 Simi-
larly, if a servant commits a tort that the master later ratifies or adopts (for ex-
ample, by accepting the benefits of the tort), the master will be liable directly.56
This sort of direct liability does not raise special considerations because it is
based squarely on the tort concepts applicable to all persons and all acts (or, in
the case of ratification, on a contractual theory of consent). Vicarious liability,
on the other hand, is based in the agency relationship itself and is not dependent
on tort principles such as fault or on tort policies such as accident prevention.
2. Vicarious Liability Explained
Originally, vicarious liability was thought to be based on the "identifica-
tion" theory, the idea that the master and servant are the same person in the eyes
of the law, 57 but that formalistic view has been rejected for at least a century.58
Today, the usual explanations for vicarious liability are versions of arguments
from the law of torts59 based on the policies of loss spreading, accident reduc-
tion, and compensation. 6° More recent economic analyses are similarly based on
53 Professor Sykes characterizes this liability as "vicarious liability based on negligence,"
apparently because the liability is based on the principal's negligence while the injury itself was
proximately caused by another person (the "vicarious" part). See Alan 0. Sykes, The Bounda-
ries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related
Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 590 (1988).
54 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 212, 213.
55 Id. at §§ 212, 219(2)(a).
56 Id. at §§ 82, 83, 218.
57 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 182 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963).
58 Holmes criticized it on numerous occasions. See id. at 181-82; Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., Agency I1, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1892); see also P. S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN
THE LAW OF TORTS 6-7 (1967) (describing a similar English theory known as the "master's tort"
theory).
59 See BATY, supra note 15, at 146-48 (listing and rejecting nine alleged justifications for
vicarious liability); Holmes, supra note 58, at 22-23 (arguing that judges have "striven to find
more intelligible reasons" for the doctrine because it is based solely on a "survival of ancient
traditions" that makes no sense in modem law); Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour 1, 23
COLUM. L. REV. 444, 452 (1923) (discussing the need for a theory to explain the law).
60 See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 52, at 295-96; Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability,
[Vol. 104
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss3/6
ALL INA DAY'S WORK
tort understandings of the law. Because they are tort theories, however, they are
incapable of either explaining or justifying vicarious liability, a doctrine not
based in the law of torts.
a. Basic Tort Theories
i. Loss Spreading
One of the justifications occasionally advanced for tort rules is that they
permit losses to be spread over some large group better able to bear the loss,
rather than resting solely on the victim.6' For example, strict products liability
ultimately spreads losses among all consumers of the product in question. Simi-
larly, commentators have argued that vicarious liability serves social justice by
spreading losses to employers and, therefore, perhaps ultimately to consumers of
whatever good the business is producing, or to the owners of that business.6
2
There are a number of problems with this rationale, both for torts and for vicari-
ous liability. First, to the extent that the goal of loss spreading is simply to in-
crease the number of persons bearing a loss, and thereby reduce the magnitude
of the loss to each payor, the availability of insurance eliminates the need for the
tort law to distribute losses, and probably spreads losses more efficiently than a
litigation-based tort system. 63 Furthermore, in many cases both the plaintiff and
the defendant will be in a position to spread losses.64 Loss spreading as a ration-
ale for strict tort liability is further subject to the criticism that it encourages
carelessness by potential plaintiffs.65 On the other hand, to the extent that the
loss-spreading policy is another name for the externalities argument discussed
below, the goal of which is to place the loss on the participants in the activity
that caused the loss, not all defendants are equal: the goal of loss-spreading can
only be achieved by ensuring that the appropriate activity bears the cost, which
28 TUL. L. REV. 161, 172 (1954); Rochelle Rubin Weber, Note, "Scope of Employment" Rede-
fined: Holding Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed by their Employ-
ees, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1513, 1518-20 (1992).
61 See JOHN J. SLAIN ET AL., AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND EMPLOYMENT: A TRANSACTIONAL
APPROACH § 1 (1980) (discussing and rejecting the loss-spreading rationale).
62 See ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 22-27; Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the
Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1329 (1997); Smith, supra note 59, at 456-
60.
63 See ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 25-26; Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace
the Rule of Strict Liability For Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611, 625-
33 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 210 (1973).
64 See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 170-71 (2d Cir.
1968); Geistfeld, supra note 63, at 625-33 (discussing the relative merits of third-party and
first-party insurance).
65 This is one of the themes of Keating, supra note 62; see also ATIYAH, supra note 58, at
26-27.
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will require analyses of the activities in question and the tort. As discussed be-
low, agency law seeks to advance a similar policy: seeking to place losses on the
business that benefits from the activity causing the loss. Unlike the tort law,
however, agency law has developed a variety of complex rules and concepts that
seek to identify those losses that are connected with a particular business. The
rationale is not to spread the losses, rather it is to coordinate losses with benefits.
ii. Deterrence/Accident Reduction
As with tort liability, one of the most frequently stated policy reasons
for vicarious liability is that it will result in fewer accidents. 66 The argument is
that masters will seek to avoid liability by selecting, training, supervising, and
equipping their servants so as to reduce the number of accidents, up to the point
at which the marginal costs of such precautions exceed the probable liability
they will prevent. This is the usual rationale for liability based on negligence,
and if it is also used in a strict liability context, such as vicarious liability, there
must be a further explanation for why the usual negligence regime, which would
hold the servant personally liable for his torts, must be supplemented by the
strict liability rule.6 7 Several explanations have been proffered. First, because
most servants have limited assets and cannot pay the full costs of the accidents
they cause, they will not take due care.68 Vicarious liability, by imposing liabil-
ity instead on employers, causes the employer to use internal measures, such as
discipline, training, and selection, to cause her employees to take due care.6 9
Alternatively, because a tort verdict might strip a servant-defendant of all his
assets, servants might be inclined to take too much care. Thus, vicarious liability
causes employers to calculate the optimum level of care and cause their employ-
ees to take such care.7 ° Others argue that, because proof of negligence following
an accident is difficult, the relevant evidence is likely to be in the control of the
master, and because it is also difficult to prove the direct negligence of the mas-
ter in hiring and supervising the servant, it is appropriate to hold the master
strictly liable.7'
66 See Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 50 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1995); Holmes, supra note 58, at
14 (arguing that vicarious liability provides "a seemingly wholesome check on the indifference
and negligence of great corporations").
67 See Geistfeld, supra note 63, at 659 (noting that where the negligence standard reduces
risks to low levels, there is little likelihood that strict liability will further reduce accident
rates).
68 See Sykes, supra note 52, at 1244.
69 See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 42-43 (1972). But
see Schwartz, supra note 52, at 1757 (rebutting this argument).
70 See Bruce Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and the Problem of Overcompliance, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1679, 1695, 1702-03 (1996).
71 See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 1760; ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 20-21. This also has
been suggested as the rationale for strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. See Ge-
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One might ask, however, in the vicarious liability context, as in the
strict liability context, why one would assume that strict liability would reduce
accidents when a negligence regime has not been shown to do so. 7 2 If the tort
theorists are correct, servants driving on business should be either more or less
careful than those driving for personal reasons. If an employee's lack of assets
makes him difficult to deter from carelessness (and if he is uninsured), he should
drive less carefully when driving for personal reasons because an accident vic-
tim will have no recourse, than when he is on his employer's business, when he
will be subject to termination for carelessness. Alternatively, he may drive more
carefully when on his own time, because he (or his insurance) will be paying
any accident claims, than when he is on business. Some of the literature on strict
liability suggests, however, that drivers do not behave this way:73 it is possible,
perhaps probable, that the driver will take care or fail to take care for reasons
that have nothing to do with liability. A driver on business may be under greater
stress, or may be more bored or inattentive, than a driver on a personal errand.74
There is also reason to question the extent to which employers can effectively
monitor and control their employees' behavior, given the agency problems that
exist in any employment relationship.75 Is the employer in any better a position
to prevent or prove negligence by a truck driver, for example, than the legal
system or other drivers?
raid W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activity: The Negligence Barrier, 36
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 630, 653-54 (1999); Geistfeld, supra note 63, at 633-38; see also id. at
664-65 (noting that employee shirking, leading to negligence, may be difficult for an employer
to detect and difficult for a plaintiff to prove). The evidence problem could be solved, of
course, by a rebuttable presumption of negligence rather than strict liability. See Boston, supra,
at 647-49.
72 See Geistfeld, supra note 63, at 639; see also ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 16-17 (arguing
that deterrence does not work as a theory if insurance is permitted).
73 See Croley, supra note 52, at 1728-30.; Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic
Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381-87 (1994); id.
at 393-97 (discussing automobile accidents); Fleming James, Jr., & John J. Dickinson, Accident
Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REV. 769, 769-77 (1950) (discussing phenomenon
that most accidents involve "accident prone" individuals).
74 In Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 1968), Judge
Friendly implicitly treated the oft-noted "proclivity of seamen to find solace for solitude by
copious resort to the bottle while ashore" as a fact militating in favor of vicarious liability for a
drunken seaman's acts because such drinking is a risk of the business.
75 See Kip SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS 79 (1990); Croley, supra
note 73, at 1714-19; Schwartz, supra note 52, at 1758-59; Catharine Pierce Wells, Corrective
Justice and Corporate Tort Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1769-70 (1996); Sykes, supra
note 68, at 1237-39. Professor Schwartz also suggests, however, that the common law's reli-
ance on control as a determinant of an employer's vicarious liability (in the context of the inde-
pendent contractor exception discussed below) illustrates the "common law's assumption that
employee negligence is to a considerable extent 'controllable'." Schwartz, supra note 52, at
1754. As I argue below, however, the independent contractor exception is not based on control
per se and does not depend on any such assumption. See infra Part II.C.3.a.i.
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The deterrence rationale may have more explanatory force if liability is
viewed as a way to deter hazardous activities rather than carelessness. Thus, a
business that is forced to bear the tort losses it generates will continue in busi-
ness only as long as the benefits of that business outweigh the liability costs.
This rationale is discussed below as "Benefit Theory/Externalities. 76
iii. Compensation
Because employers usually have more assets than their employees, one
reason to hold employers liable, from the plaintiff s point of view, is to ensure a
recovery." Early commentators argued that the corporation's dominance of the
business world required that corporations be held vicariously liable for their
employees' torts. Corporations, by virtue of their public status, had a public duty
to pay for the injuries they caused, and without such liability, the families of the
injured would experience great hardship. 8 In other words, vicarious liability is
like workers' compensation: it is simply a social policy.7
9
Although a pure compensation rationale is, perhaps, no more justifiable
than theft,8° when viewed as corrective justice it is a legitimate goal of the tort
system.81 But corrective justice requires that the payor be in some sense respon-
sible for the injury. Responsibility may arise from fault, 82 from a failure to act
with "due regard for the autonomy of others," 83 or from community standards as
expressed by a jury.84 In each case, however, the relevant question will be the
connection between the tort and the employer, a question which requires a busi-
ness law, rather than a tort law, analysis.85
76 See infra Part II.C.2.b.i.
77 See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §§ 4:1, 4:2 (1983);
MECHEM, supra note 51, § 1856; Glanville Williams, Vicarious Liability and the Master's
Indemnity, 20 MOD. L. REV. 220, 232 (1957); BATY, supra note 15, at 154.
78 See Harold Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L. J. 105, 111-15, 122-26
(1916); James, supra note 60, at 170-71.
79 See Laski, supra note 78, at 126-30.
80 See Williams, supra note 77, at 232.
81 See generally Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One's
Neighbors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992).
82 See Wells, supra note 75, at 1770 n.2 (citing Jules Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts:
Their Scope and Limits, Part 11, 2 L. & PHIL. 5, 6 (1983)).
83 See id. at 1773-74 (citing Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law,
2 L. & PHIL. 37, 40 (1983)).
94 See id. at 1777-78 (citing Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justifica-
tion for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1990)); see also Geistfeld, supra note 63, at
647-51 (considering and rejecting compensation as a rationale for strict liability for ultrahaz-
ardous activities).
85 See infra notes 123-129 and accompanying text; infra Part II.C.3.b.iii.
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b. Economic Theories
In addition to traditional tort theories, two further bases for tort liability
and vicarious liability have been advanced by advocates of an economic analy-
sis of the law.
i. Benefit Theory/Externalities
Basic economic analysis suggests that an actor must be made to bear all
the costs of her activities, including those that, in the natural course of things,
would fall upon third parties, in order to provide an incentive for the actor to
engage only in cost-justified activities. Thus, making a cement factory compen-
sate its neighbors for the injuries they sustain from the dust, noise, and vibra-
tions from the factory ensures that cement will be produced only if the revenues
it creates exceed all the costs of production.86 In economic parlance, tort liability
can force an actor to internalize the costs of such "externalities" and thus lead to
more efficient activity levels. This argument is sometimes applied to justify vi-
carious liability: the employee's torts are an externality of the employer's busi-
ness, and the employer must be made to bear these losses.87 This analysis begs
an important question: which torts are externalities of the business and why?
The answer to that question again forces one into business law principles. At the
same time, the externalities argument incorporates the fundamental business
principle that a business owner must bear all the costs, as well as receive the
benefits, of her business, If externalities are connected to the benefits the busi-
ness receives, they must be included in the costs of doing business. Thus, one
might say that the master is liable because she benefits from the tortious con-
duct.88 Strictly speaking, the master probably does not benefit, on a net basis,
from the tortious conduct per se, although she may benefit from the activity
giving rise to the tortious conduct, such as the delivery of her goods giving rise
to a traffic accident or the collection of her debt giving rise to a battery. Even
more fundamentally, however, the master benefits from the existence of the
agency relationship in the first place. If the master did not hire the servant, she
would be forced to deliver the goods or collect the debt herself. She might, in
such a case, have a better chance to prevent the tort (although there is no par-
ticular reason to believe she would be less negligent or prone to violence than
86 This example is, of course, based on the law school chestnut, Boomer v. At. Cement Co.,
257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
87 See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 514, 543-45 (1961).
88 See HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.5 (3rd ed.
1992); SLAIN ET AL., supra note 61, § 1. Another version of this argument maintains that, where
a tortfeasor uses the power or authority of her employment to commit a tort, the master should
be liable because the master benefits from the grant of power or authority and thus should bear
the costs of that grant. See Weber, supra note 60, at 1535-41; Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles,
814 P.2d 1341, 1349-50 (Cal. 1991).
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her servant), 89 but she would incur the opportunity cost of not being able to en-
gage in other business activities. Thus, if the master is rational, she has consid-
ered the costs and benefits of hiring agents and servants ab initio, as well as of
engaging in this particular activity and of engaging in business generally.90 Even
where the employer is a large corporation, it is reaping the benefits of employ-
ing agents because without employees large, efficient, integrated businesses
could not exist. Identifying those torts that ought to be included in the costs of a
business is a complex process. As described further below, agency law has de-
veloped a number of vicarious liability doctrines that seek to identify such torts.
ii. Enterprise Liability
In the past few decades, some torts scholars have espoused enterprise li-
ability, 91 variously described as the principle that "business enterprises ought to
be responsible for losses resulting from products they introduce into com-
merce, '  as "corporate liability for [the] acts of its agents, 93 and as the proposi-
tion that "business activities should be governed by strict liability." 94 If enter-
prise liability is taken to mean that businesses should bear the burdens, as well
as the benefits, of their activities, 95 it is simply a new word for the common law
of agency.96 The concept is usually used, however, to justify broader liability
than regular vicarious liability, including strict products liability,97 and it is
89 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
90 See also SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 6298 (1894) (observing that, under a rule that relieves a master of liability
when her servant commits an intentional tort, "it would always be more safe and profitable for
a man to conduct his business vicariously than in his own person .... Meanwhile, the public,
obliged to deal or come in contact with his agents, for intentional injuries done by them, might
be left wholly without redress."), quoted in Lange v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 785
(Minn. 1973).
91 In the early part of the twentieth century this concept was known as the "entrepreneur
theory." See William 0. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk 1, 38 YALE
L.J. 584, 585-86 (1929); see also id. at 586 n.6 (citing BATY, supra note 15; Smith, supra note
59; F. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 100-05 (2d ed. 1924); Laski,
supra note 78; and A. WILLET, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF RISK AND INSURANCE 58, 140
(1901)); id. at 595-98 (discussing the entrepreneur theory in the context of the independent
contractor exception); see also Lange v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. 1973).
92 George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellec-
tual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461,463 (1985).
93 Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 692 n.l.
94 Geistfeld, supra note 63, at 613.
95 See Keating, supra note 62, at 1269; Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitaliza-
tion of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 280 (1987).
96 See infra Parts III.C.2.c.ii, III.C.3.
97 See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 95, at 257; Wells, supra note 75, at 1775-76; Exner v.
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sometimes based on some supposed structural difficulty in the way tort law ap-
plies to large corporations. For example, enterprise liability is justified as a way
to offset the "shareholder primacy norm" popular with corporate decision-
makers, pursuant to which corporations are operated to maximize shareholder
wealth, rather than, say, social welfare.98 Alternatively, enterprise liability is
said to be desirable because, unlike individuals, firms usually are rational deci-
sion-makers that engage in sophisticated cost-benefit analysis. 99 Whatever en-
terprise liability is, however, it too requires an understanding of the nature and
extent of the "enterprise" and thus is subject to the same limitations as the other
tort theories. As further described below, agency law, properly understood, pro-
vides such an understanding through legal doctrines that identify both the per-
sons and the activities that can appropriately be considered part of the enter-
prise.
c. Business Theories
Several of the theories described above simply use different terms to ar-
ticulate the basic agency law principle that risk and loss must be borne along
with benefit and profit, thereby illustrating the basic and enduring nature of
those principles. Most agency law commentators have adopted one of two theo-
ies. The control theory, an older and more mechanical concept, is still some-
times applied by courts. The risks-and-benefits-of-the-business theory has
largely supplanted the control theory among commentators and is more widely
reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Agency.' 00
i. Control Theory
Some commentators define the essence of the agency relationship to be
control. Control is one of the elements of the agency relationship generally, and
it is an important factor in determining whether an agent is a servant.'0 1 Simi-
larly, some commentators argue that vicarious liability is based on the master's
"implied power to control the actor's conduct."' 0 2 At one level, control is said to
give rise to liability because the master, by virtue of her control, is in a position
Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931); Green v. Gen. Petroleum Corp.,
270 P. 952, 955 (Cal. 1928).
98 See Wells, supra note 75, at 1778-79.
99 See Croley, supra note 73, at 1733-37.
100 The Restatement, in fact, contains references to both theories, although the risks-and-
benefits-of-the-business theory appears more frequently and more generally underlies the Re-
statement's version of the law. See infra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
101 See infra Part III.C.3.a.i. See also James, supra note 60, at 165.
102 PERRIT, supra note 88, § 7.5. Such implication presumably arises from the fact that the
agent must have passed the control test to be a servant.
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to prevent, or at least to reduce the frequency of, accidents. 0 3 Alternatively,
control gives rise to liability because there is an element of dormant fault in the
fact that the accident occurred. If the employer has control, it must ultimately be
her fault if an accident happened.' °4
Most commentators, however, accept that control, even in the employer-
employee context, is largely illusory, especially in large or decentralized busi-
nesses. 0 5 To the extent that actual control exists and can be proven, the em-
ployer will be directly liable and vicarious liability will be irrelevant.' °6 If con-
trol is only theoretical or cannot be shown, vicarious liability must rest on some
other basis. As argued below, control is better understood as an incident of own-
ership of a business, 10 7 and it is relevant in determining liability only because
liability is, or should be, a concomitant incident of such ownership. This is the
risks-and-benefits-of-the-business theory.
ii. Risks and Benefits of the Business Theory
Agency law is based on the fundamental premise that the principal re-
tains all the incidents of ownership of the enterprise: 108 ultimate (although per-
haps not day-to-day) control; the benefit of profits, revenues, and opportunities
arising from the business; ownership of (and exclusive right to use) business
property; responsibility for financial losses; and liability for tort and contractual
obligations of the business. For example, a principal may not retain the benefits
of a contract while disclaiming the authority of the agent who entered into it. A
principal may also not hold out an agent as authorized, or even avail herself of
an agent's services, and then escape the obligations entered into by the agent in
accordance with that authority or with accepted business practices.1°9 Thus, al-
though the agency relationship is often said to have three elements - consent by
both the principal and the agent, control by the principal, and the agent's acting
on the principal's behalf" 10 - it is inappropriate to separate the latter two defini-
103 See Keating, supra note 62, at 1343-45.
104 This is the reasoning attributed to ancient rules holding owners liable for animals and
dangerous objects. See John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History II, 7
HARV. L. REV. 441, 451-55 (1894). For a variation on this theme, see Keating, supra note 62, at
1357-58 (arguing that control over incidence of accidents leads to moral responsibility for those
accidents).
105 See supra note 75.
106 See supra Part III.C.1. See also James, supra note 60, at 165-67.
107 See infra Parts III.C.2.c.ii, III.C.3.a.i.
108 In fact, it is the separation of some of these incidents from ownership that creates special
issues for corporate law not relevant here. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 5-10 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932).
109 See supra Part III.B.
110 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
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tional elements. The control comes from and is incident to the fact that the busi-
ness is being operated on the principal's behalf. It is part of the concept of own-
ership.
In most cases, both the principal and the agent benefit from the relation-
ship. It is a consensual relationship and the agent must derive a benefit from it or
he would not agree to subject himself to the agent's fiduciary obligations."' The
principal also derives a business benefit from the act of employing agents gener-
ally, because without agency, her business would be limited to those activities
she could personally undertake. In short, the use of agents makes business pos-
sible. " 2 It is therefore not inaccurate to characterize the principal as receiving a
benefit from the relationship beyond that received by the agent." 3 Each party
receives a financial benefit in the exchange of labor for compensation, but the
principal receives the additional benefit of being able to use agents generally. "14
Tort liabilities are therefore only one of a variety of liabilities and re-
sponsibilities that the law imposes on the principal because they are, "in fair-
ness," part of her business.1 5 Thus, when the agent is an independent contractor,
his acts are part of his own business, not the principal's, and the principal is not
vicariously liable for those acts.' 16 Courts frequently invoke this fundamental
notion of fairness in the business context,1 17 and commentators have found some
moral philosophical basis for it in Kantian and Aristotelian thought. 18 For the
purposes of this Article, however, it is enough to note that the law in fact re-
flects a continuing attempt to coordinate the benefits and burdens of business,
and any effort to explain business law must be based on that concept." 9 For
III See id.
112 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 418 ("[W]ithout such a doctrine as [re-
spondeat superior], no mutual intercourse between man and man could subsist with any toler-
able convenience.").
113 Cf MECHEM, supra note 51, § 1856 (arguing that because both the principal and agent
benefit from the relationship, vicarious liability cannot be based solely on the fact that the prin-
cipal benefits from the agency relationship).
114 Cf. ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 19 (arguing that principals get "residual" benefits from the
use of agents); see also BATY, supra note 15, at 147 (discussed in ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 21)
(discussing the idea that principals are held liable for their agents torts because they are permit-
ted to use agents).
15 See Keating, supra note 62, at 1269, 1273, 1326; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
8A (1958).
116 See infra Part III.C.3.a.i.
117 See ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 28.
118 See Keating, supra note 62, at 1273, 1326 (arguing that the best way to balance compet-
ing liberty and security interests is to connect benefits and burdens).
119 There are other business law doctrines, besides vicarious liability, that reflect this phi-
losophy. For example, one of the usual elements required before a court will pierce the corpo-
rate veil is "an overall element of injustice or unfairness," Harper v. Del. Valley Broadcasters,
Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1076, 1085 (D. Del. 1990). This is often proved by a showing of unjust en-
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example, the borrowed servant doctrine in agency, which deals with the situa-
tion where one employer's employee is temporarily acting as another's, places
vicarious liability for the employee's torts on the employer whose business the
employee was benefitting at the time of the occurrence of the tort.120 Where both
businesses are benefitting, both employers are liable.12 ' Similarly, a principal
must indemnify an agent for expenses incurred on the principal's behalf, but
need not indemnify an agent for the costs of the agent's own business. For ex-
ample, the practice is for clients to reimburse attorneys for telephone calls, pho-
tocopying and telecopying, and travel undertaken directly in the client's service,
but not for "overhead" expenses such as office space, record-keeping, utilities,
and library expenses.
1 22
Once one accepts that the point of agency law generally, and of vicari-
ous liability in particular, is to coordinate the burdens and benefits of a business,
the tricky question is identifying those burdens and benefits that go with the
business. This can sometimes be based on the customs and practices of an indus-
try, l12 as is the case with the determination of independent contractor status dis-
cussed below. 124 In other cases, courts and commentators look to concepts of
causation and foreseeability, although not in the tort-law sense.1 25 For example,
Professor Sykes has elaborated a scheme to determine when an enterprise can be
said to have "caused" a tort, based upon the extent to which the employment
relationship "increases the probability" of the occurrence of the tort. 126 This test,
although compelling, raises a question about the generality of the analysis. Is it
the probability of the specific tort, including the identity of or category of the
plaintiff (such as assault of a customer), or of the category of the tort (such as
assault), or of torts generally, that must be considered? Sykes appears to apply
his test to the category of the plaintiff. He uses as an example the probability of
negligent repairs in the case of employment of a service station attendant. 127
richment, such as a corporate shareholder's diverting assets from the corporation to herself,
thus leaving the corporation unable to meet its obligations. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper
Source, 993 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1993).
120 See James, supra note 60, at 196-97 n.156.
121 Id.
122 My support for this is largely anecdotal. See also HYNES, supra note 15, at 83; WARREN
A. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY 266 (1964) (discussing real estate agents); Cory Bros. & Co. v.
United States, 51 F.2d 1010, 1014 (2d Cir. 1931) (noting that "[tihe risks of an independent
contractor's business are his own").
123 See SEAVEY, supra note 122, at 266.
124 See infra Part II.C.3.a.i.
125 See, e.g., MECHEM, supra note 51, § 1883 (arguing that the principal should be liable
where she puts the agent into a position requiring the agent to use his own judgment).
126 See Sykes, supra note 53, at 572.
127 Id.
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Professor Keating uses a similar analysis: does the business activity increase the
probability of this type of tort beyond its base-line, "background," probability in
the world at large. 28 Most commentators argue that such increased risk-
causation must also be reasonably foreseeable, in the common sense of the
term. 29 This requirement makes sense in the business context because a well-
run business will calculate the interplay of risks and rewards, but can only be
expected to do so for those that are foreseeable. It is worth noting that, although
the coordination of burdens and benefits is a fundamental principle of agency
law, it is closely analogous to the law of strict liability for ultrahazardous activi-
ties.1 30 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is sub-
ject to liability for harm to ... another resulting from the activ-
ity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the
harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possi-
bility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.1
31
Thus, liability is premised on the risk the defendant has created, but the
harm resulting from the risk must be, in a sense, foreseeable. 132 The "fairness"
policy rationale for vicarious liability also resonates in the context of ultrahaz-
ardous activities. As Learned Hand wrote in one ultrahazardous activity case,
"The extent to which one man in the lawful conduct of his business is liable for
injuries to another involves an adjustment of conflicting interests. 133 In the
words of Holmes,
The same reasoning which would make a man answerable in
128 See Keating, supra note 62, at 1280, 1287-88. See also ATiYAH, supra note 58, at 28, 172.
Cf. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 95, at 290-291 (discussing a non-reciprocal risk test for enter-
prise liability); Keating, supra note 62, at 1328 (arguing against such a test).
129 See Keating, supra note 62, at 1288 n.68; ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 172; Ira S. Bushey &
Sons, Inc., 398 F.2d at 171-72. See also HOLMES, supra note 57, at 75-76, 116-17, 127-28 (dis-
cussing the importance of foreseeability in attributing legal responsibility for risks generally).
130 See ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 21-22 (comparing vicarious liability to liability for animals
and leaking reservoirs).
131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 519(2) (1977).
132 See Green v. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952, 955 (Cal. 1928); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 519 (1938); Boston, supra note 71, at 617 (describing limited change to foreseeability re-
quirement in Restatement (Second) of Torts).
133 Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931); cf Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 223 (Wash. 1977) (holding that in a case involving strict liabil-
ity for an abnormally dangerous activity, "there can be an equitable balancing of social interests
only if appellants are made to pay for the consequences of their acts").
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trespass for all damage to another by force directly resulting
from his own act, irrespective of negligence or intent, would
make him answerable in case for the like damage similarly re-
sulting from the act of his servant, in the course of the latter's
employment. 134
In sum, the best explanation for vicarious liability lies in agency law
generally: it forces the owner of a business to pay costs, including tort liabilities,
associated with her business. An examination of vicarious liability doctrine re-
veals not only that this is the underlying policy of the law, but also the answer to
the continuing question, what costs can be said to be associated with a business
and therefore the responsibility of the owner of the business?
3. Vicarious Liability Doctrine
The fact that there is no accepted theoretical basis for vicarious liability
has left the specific rules governing liability in some confusion, although the
general framework is clear. First, the law of vicarious liability is the same
whether the underlying tort is an intentional tort, an act of negligence, or a strict
liability tort, 135 a fact that in itself indicates that the doctrine is not about torts at
all. Whatever the nature of the underlying tort, the principal will be liable only if
the tortfeasor was a servant, rather than an independent contractor, and only if
the tort was committed within the scope of the servant's employment.
a. The Master/Servant Relationship
The requirement that there be a master/servant relationship between the
defendant and the tortfeasor is sometimes known as the "independent contractor
exception,"'' 36 reflecting the fact that vicarious liability is an agency law doctrine
that applies only to some agents. Agents who are independent contractors, rather
than servants, are excepted from the rule.' 3
7
1. The Independent Contractor Exception
The distinction between a "servant" and a non-servant agent (an inde-
pendent contractor) is often said to be based on the degree of control the princi-
134 HOLMES, supra note 57, at 73. See also Keating, supra note 62, at 1289-93 (comparing
rationale for strict liability for ultrahazardous activities with vicarious liability).
135 See ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 263.
136 See HYNES, supra note 15, at 157.
137 This, again, reflects the fact that vicarious liability is not a tort law doctrine. If it were,
not only independent contractors would be excepted, but the entire world other than masters
and servants.
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pal exerts over the agent's performance of his duties.1 38 In fact, this control test
is only a proxy for a more basic, but harder to define, idea: either the agent is
employed in the principal's business, 139 in which case the agent is a servant, or
the agent is engaged in a business of his own, in which case he is an independ-
ent contractor. 140 As the Restatement puts it, the servant is "an integral part of
his master's establishment,""141 whereas the non-servant "aids in the business
enterprise but is not a part of it.
' 142
The Restatement provides a set of factors that are to be used in deter-
mining whether an agent is an independent contractor. 143 The factors are
(a) the extent of control which... the master may exercise over
the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the [agent] is engaged in a distinct occupa-
tion or business;
(c)... whether... the work is usually done under the direction
of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether [the principal or the agent] supplies the instrumen-
138 The Restatement describes an independent contractor as someone who "contracts with
another to do something for [her] but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the
other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertak-
ing." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958). A servant, on the other hand, is some-
one "whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the
right to control by the master." Id. § 2 (2).
139 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, ch. 7: Liability of Principal to Third Persons;
Torts, Topic 2: Liability for Authorized Conduct or Conduct Incidental Thereto; Title B: Torts
of Servants, Introductory Note (1958). The Restatement also defines a servant as someone
within the "business household of the principal," a strange concept that appears to be a remnant
of the alleged ancient Roman roots of vicarious liability in the liability of the Roman paterfa-
milias for the acts of all those within his patria potestas, a concept sometimes loosely defined
as a household. See id. at 478.
140 As Holmes noted, the exception is based on the fact that "the independent contractor acts
in his own name and on his own behalf." Holmes, supra note 58, at 15.
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, ch. 7: Liability of Principal to Third Persons; Torts,
Topic 2: Liability for Authorized Conduct or Conduct Incidental Thereto; Title B: Torts of
Servants, Introductory Note (1958).
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, ch. 7: Liability of Principal to Third Persons; Torts,
Topic 2: Liability for Authorized Conduct or Conduct Incidental Thereto; Title B: Torts of
Servants, Introductory Note (1958). cf W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 509 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing argument that even in the case of an
independent contractor, "the enterprise is still the employer's").
143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
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talities, tools and the place of work... ;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the rela-
tionship of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 44
Some of those factors seem to define the concept of "physical con-
trol," 45 but they are more clearly a way of determining when someone is en-
gaged in his own independent business. 146 Ownership of tools, control over time
and location, and payment on a per-job basis are all characteristics of an inde-
pendent business owner. Factors (a), (b), (e), (g) and arguably (h) are directed at
the common sense view of "whose business is this?" rather than "who's in con-
trol here?" If, as I argue, vicarious liability is best understood as a means to en-
sure that a business bears both its benefits and its burdens, then the point of the
independent contractor exception is to exclude those burdens, or risks, that are
not part of the defendant's business (because they are in fact risks of another
business - the independent contractor' S).147
ii. Vicarious Liability by Estoppel or "Apparent
Agency"
144 Id.; see also ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 50-69.
145 Holmes, for instance, thought the independent contractor exception provided a common
sense limit on vicarious liability, because it eliminated liability where the principal did not
control the acts of the agent. See Holmes, supra note 58, at 15-16. He also thought the use of
other factors was "evidence of the want of any more profound or logical reason" for the excep-
tion. Id.
146 See Sykes, supra note 68, at 1262, 1269-71 (arguing that the independent contractor
exception is an attempt to limit vicarious liability only to situations in which the tortfeasor's
conduct was "observable" by the defendant, and therefore where the defendant's policies would
be able to deter tortious conduct); Posner, supra note 69, at 43 (arguing that the independent
contractor exception is an attempt to limit vicarious liability only to situations in which the
defendant would be able to prevent the tortious conduct and, additionally, to situations in which
the tortfeasor is likely to be judgment-proof and therefore not likely to be deterred by liability);
Smith, supra note 59, at 460-61 (arguing that the independent contractor exception is an at-
tempt to impose vicarious liability on the party best able to spread the loss).
147 See James, supra note 60, at 193-201, 196-97 n.156.
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The independent contractor exception is itself limited by the strange
doctrine of "vicarious liability by estoppel" or "apparent agency.' 48 This doc-
trine occasionally permits a tort plaintiff to reach the principal despite the fact
that the tortfeasor was not a servant. 149 Frequently used to create hospital liabil-
ity for the acts and omissions of emergency room physicians who are, as a legal
matter, clearly independent contractors, the doctrine holds a principal liable if
the plaintiff can show that she was unaware of the doctor's status as an inde-
pendent contractor, that the hospital held itself out as providing emergency room
care, and that she relied on the hospital, rather than any particular physician, to
provide health care. 150 Like other instances of vicarious tort liability based on
apparent authority,' 1 the "apparent agency" doctrine is based on the element of
misrepresentation contained in the principal's statements, combined with the
plaintiff's reliance thereon. 52 It is also consistent with the general principle of
vicarious liability described above, that a business should bear both its burdens
and benefits. If a business is holding out independent contractors as servants, it
is seeking to "have its cake and eat it too" by avoiding liability while appearing
to offer full service and responsibility. Just as there are some duties that one is
not permitted to delegate, 153 one is not permitted, vis-a-vis third parties, secretly
to contract out of the master-servant relationship.
15 4
b. The Scope of Employment
A master is only liable for torts of a servant that occur while the servant
is acting within the "scope of employment."' 155 This is a natural enough rule,
156
but the definition of the scope of employment is open to considerable contro-
148 The quotation marks here indicate that this is not apparent authority in the usual sense of
the word, described supra Part III.B.1.
149 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958). The doctrine has also been used to
hold defendants liable where the tortfeasor was not an agent at all. See Crinkley v. Holiday
Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1988) (allowing plaintiffs to reach franchisor upon showing of
reliance).
150 See Gilbert v. Sycamore Mem'l Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 794-96 (I11. 1993).
151 See supra Part III.B.1.
152 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 265-267 (1958).
153 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214 (1958). See also infra note 281.
'54 See James v. Ingalls Mem'l Hosp., 701 N.E.2d 207, 212 (111. App. 1998) (holding that
hospital was not vicariously liable where plaintiffs testimony clearly indicated that the rela-
tionship between the hospital and its physicians was not a factor in her decision to go to that
hospital).
155 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
156 Cf Holmes, supra note 58, at 15-16 (describing the scope of employment limitation as a
common sense limitation on a rule - the identification of principal and agent - that was too
broad).
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versy. There are several tests for determining when the servant is acting within
the scope of his employment.
i. Restatement "Purpose to Serve"
The Restatement provides that
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if,
but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and
space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master; and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against an-
other, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
1 57
Additionally, "conduct must be of the same general nature as that au-
thorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized. ' 1 58 The most important part of
this test in difficult cases is the requirement that there be a "purpose to serve"
the master. Most American states accept this as the basic test for evaluating
whether an act was committed within the scope of employment, 59 but its limita-
157 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
158 Id. at § 229(1).
159 See Fisher v. Townsends, Inc., 695 A.2d 53 (Del. 1997); Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee,
327 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1985); Sandman v. Hagan, 154 N.W.2d 113 (Iowa 1967); Podolan v. Idaho
Legal Aid Serv., Inc., 854 P.2d 280 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); Gaffney v. City of Chicago, 706
N.E.2d 914 (Il. App. Ct. 1998); Doe v. Louisiana Mun. Ass'n, 746 So. 2d 179 (La. Ct. App.
1999); Leek v. Cohen, 38 A.2d 460 (Me. 1944); Schlichte v. Granite Sav. Bank, 662 N.E.2d
238 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); Brinkman v. Zuckerman, 159 N.W. 316 (Mich. 1916); National
Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Fantauzzi, 584 P.2d 689 (Nev. 1978); Wilson v. Peverly, 2 N.H.
548 (1823); Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508 (N.J. 1982); Sheridan v. Charlick, 4 Daly 338
(N.Y. Com. P1. 1872); Lourim v. Swensen, 977 P.2d 1157 (Or. 1999); Vargas Mfg. Co. v.
Friedman, 661 A.2d 48 (R.I. 1995); Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 840 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Poplaski v. Lamphere, 565 A.2d 1326 (Vt. 1989);
Courtless v. Jolliffe, 507 S.E.2d 136 (W. Va. 1998); Thiery v. Bye, 597 N.W.2d 449 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1999). An alternative formulation of the test focuses on whether the employee was acting
"in furtherance of the business" of the employer. See Ex pane Atmore Cmty. Hosp., 719 So. 2d
1190 (Ala. 1998); Porter v. Harshfield, 948 S.W.2d 83 (Ark. 1997); Grease Monkey Int'l, Inc.
v. Montoya, 904 P.2d 468 (Colo. 1995); Hankard v. Town of Avon, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1679 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 21, 1999); Sebastian v. District of Columbia, 636 A.2d 958 (D.C.
1994); Gowan v. Bay County, 744 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Wong-Leong v.
Hawaiian Indep. Refinery, Inc., 879 P.2d 538 (Haw. 1994); City of Fort Wayne v. Moore, 706
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tions are obvious. First, assessing the motives of the servant may be a difficult
matter.16° The Restatement reports that the test is a subjective one: the question
is the state of mind of the servant at the time of committing the tort, although the
actions and statements by the servant should be used as evidence of state of
mind. 16 1 Problems frequently arise in applying this test. In one leading case, the
tortfeasor's behavior in turning some valves on a drydock was inexplicable,
there had been no witnesses to the tort, and the tortfeasor had disappeared prior
to trial; his motives were therefore completely unknown.
162
Furthermore, because a mixed motive is usually sufficient to place an
act within the scope of employment, plaintiffs stretch to find ways in which the
servant might have thought he was serving the master in committing the tort.
16 3
In many battery cases, what appears to have begun as an attempt to serve the
master degenerates into a personal grudge. Courts have difficulty determining
whether there was a purpose to serve the master in such cases, 164 although plain-
N.E.2d 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Shedd Brown Mfg. Co. v. Tichenor, 257 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1953); Lovelace v. Anderson, 730 A.2d 774 (Md. 1999); Hentges v. Thomford, 569
N.W.2d 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Odier v. Sumrall, 353 So. 2d 1370 (Miss. 1978); Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Huger, 728 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Ellinghouse v. Ajax Live Stock Co.,
152 P. 481 (Mont. 1915); Plock v. Crossroads Joint Venture, 475 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1991);
Childers v. Southern Pac. Co., 149 P. 307 (N.M. 1915); B.B. Walker Co. v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Serv., Inc., 424 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Bodle v. Wenner, 266 N.W. 894 (N.D. 1936);
Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Iandiorio v. Kriss & Senko Enter., Inc., 517 A.2d
530 (Pa. 1986); Lane v. Modern Music, Inc., 136 S.E.2d 713 (S.C. 1964); Drew v. Stanton, 603
N.W.2d 79 (S.D. 1999); Lyon v. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc., 997 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1999); Roughton Pontiac Corp. v. Alston, 372 S.E.2d 147 (Va. 1988); Thompson v.
Everett Clinic, 860 P.2d 1054 (Wash. App. 1993); Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 1980).
160 See THOMPSON, supra note 90, § 6298 (criticizing a rule that "made a certain mental
condition of the servant the test by which to determine whether he was acting about his mas-
ter's business or not"), quoted in Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn.
1973).
161 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 cmt. a (1958). See also MECHEM, supra
note 51, § 1900 (stating that the master may be liable for a servant's deviation that is made to
enable the servant to accomplish "some incidental purpose of his own, if, notwithstanding this,
his main end and purpose was still the performance of his master's business").
162 See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 169-70 (2d Cir. 1968).
163 See Overton v. Ebert, 580 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (rejecting plaintiffs
argument that employee going to store to get soda and snack was within scope of employment
because he "was furthering the course of his employment by replenishing himself with food
which would give him the energy to continue the back-breaking work he endured as a yard-
man"); Rivas v. Nationwide Personal Sec. Corp., 559 So.2d 668, 670 (Fla. App. 1990) (finding
sufficient evidence to support verdict that employee was acting within scope of employment
where he began choking the store manager and then struck the cashier, who was screaming for
help, to silence her and thus defuse a disruptive situation in the store).
164 See Lange v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. 1973) ("[W]e reject as the
basis for imposing liability the arbitrary determination of when, and at what point, the argument
and assault leave the sphere of the employer's business and become motivated by personal
animosity.").
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tiffs sometimes prevail.165 In sexual assault cases, on the other hand, courts rou-
tinely find that there was no purpose to serve the master, 66 despite the fact that
the motives for sexual assaults are no better understood than the motives for
violent, nonsexual ones. Second, it is not clear why the servant's subjective mo-
tivation for committing the tort should matter. 67 In the negligence cases, for
example, a servant who is engaged on a "detour" - a minor deviation from his
job - is deemed to be acting within the scope of employment while a servant
engaged in a "frolic" is not. In both cases, the servant is acting, by definition, for
his own purposes; the difference is the distance, literally and figuratively, which
the servant has traveled outside his regular duties. Thus, even in traditional re-
spondeat superior analysis motive is not always the determining factor. The
Restatement itself places the defining principle in scope of employment analysis
elsewhere: "the ultimate question is whether or not it is just that the loss result-
ing from the servant's acts should be considered as one of the normal risks to be
borne by the business in which the servant is employed." 168 In sum, the purpose-
to-serve test, like the control-based version of the independent contractor excep-
tion, is only a means to determine whether the tort occurred within the master's
enterprise, and it should be applied with that principle in mind. 169
Finally, if the purpose-to-serve test is intended to present a bright-line
rule, it fails to do so.170 For one thing, evidence of the servant's motives will be
subject to manipulation after the fact. Depending on the master's response to the
occurrence of the tort, the servant may find his recollections biased in one direc-
tion or the other. Also, modern psychology provides ample opportunity to
muddy the waters of motivation. As discussed below, 17 1 actions that may appear
to be motivated solely by a desire for personal gratification may in fact be moti-
vated by complex considerations generated by the employment environment and
165 See, e.g., Carr v. Win. C. Crowell Co., 171 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1946); Lange v. Nat'l Biscuit Co.,
211 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 1973); Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd., 867 P.2d 1241
(Okla. 1993); Clark v. Pangan, 998 P.2d 268 (Utah 2000). But see KEETON ET AL., supra note
142, § 70 n. 48 (collecting cases where violent assaults were held to be outside the scope of
employment, even though there was a purpose to serve the principal).
166 See infra Part III.B.
167 Mechem also rejects the purpose-to-serve test as missing the point: "The relation of the
means to the end, and the question of the ordinary or extraordinary nature of the act would be
more material [than an intention to benefit the master]." MECHEM, supra 51, § 1882. Other
commentators have argued that the question should be whether the conduct is a "mode of carry-
ing out" the authorized act, not what the servant's purpose was in selecting that mode. See
ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 197-200.
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. a (1958).
169 See James, supra note 60, at 183 ("[T]he servant's motive is significant only to the extent
that it sheds light on whether his conduct may fairly be regarded as a risk of his master's busi-
ness.").
170 See ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 191-97.
171 See infra Part IV.A.1.
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even by a desire to "improve" the workplace. As Judge Friendly noted, the pur-
pose-to-serve test has been applied in a "highly artificial way," as "courts have
gone to considerable lengths to find such a [purpose]" and impose liability.
72
ii. Engendered by the Employment
A somewhat different test recently revitalized by the California Su-
preme Court is the "engendered by the employment" test. 173 Under this test, an
act is within the scope of employment if there was a "causal nexus" between the
tort and the employment relationship.174 The causal nexus must be more than
that the work provided the opportunity for interaction between the victim and
the tortfeasor. Rather, the incident must be an "outgrowth" of the employ-
ment.175 Thus, where a hospital employee sexually assaulted a patient, the act
would be within the scope of employment only where the employee's duties
involved "work-related emotional involvement"'176 or "intense emotions" on the
part of either the employee or the patient, 177 or where the "motivating emotions"
of the tort were otherwise "fairly attributable to work-related events or condi-
tions."'178 Other courts and commentators have proposed similar tests.' 79 The
engendered-by-the-employment test is generally used where the servant has
committed an assault or battery, a situation where the purpose-to-serve test is
frequently difficult to apply, and the test reflects an attempt to determine
172 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1968). Judge
Friendly cited the "well-known opinion" of a case in which a seaman who routed another sea-
man from his bunk and proceeded to engage in a fight was held to be within the scope of em-
ployment because the seaman "might have thought he was acting in the interest of the ship." Id.
(citing Nelson v. American-West African Line, 86 F.2d 730 (2nd Cir. 1936)). For another criti-
cism of the application of the scope-of-employment requirement, which he attributes to the
basic unworkability of the identification doctrine, see Holmes, supra note 58, at 16-19.
173 See Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 361 (Cal. 1995), citing
Carr v. Win. C. Crowell Co., 171 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1946).
174 Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 361.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 364.
177 Id. at 365.
178 Id. at 364.
179 See Rodebush By and Through Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd., 867 P.2d
1241 (Okla. 1993), quoting Russell-Locke Super-Service, Inc. v. Vaughn, 40 P.2d 1090, 1094
(Okla. 1935) (finding liability where the tort arose "from some impulse of emotion which natu-
rally grew out of or was incident to the attempt to perform the master's business"); Lange v.
Nat'l Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn. 1973) (finding liability where the "precipitating
cause" of an argument leading to an assault "concerned the employee's conduct of his work");
Sykes, supra note 53, at 572, 588 (advocating a rule that imposes liability where the enterprise
"causes" the injury by increasing the probability that the tort will occur). See also KEETON ET
AL. supra note 142, § 70, at 507.
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whether the risk of assault is "typical of or broadly incidental to the enter-
prise." 80 It is therefore best understood as a specific application of the risk-of-
the-enterprise test described below.
iii. Risk of the Enterprise/Foreseeability
The fundamental principle underlying the scope of employment re-
quirement is that a master should be liable only for torts that are in some sense a
part of her business,' 8' just as the fundamental principle underlying the inde-
pendent contractor exception is that a principal should be liable only for torts
committed by those who are working as part of her business. Thus, the scope of
a servant's employment should be determined by reference to a test that seeks to
identify the risks of the enterprise and compares those risks to the servant's acts
in the particular case. 82 One such test 183 asks whether the risk of harms of the
kind involvedI84 is characteristic of the enterprise. Identification of such charac-
teristic risks is in turn based on foreseeability.1
85
Judge Friendly's opinion in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United
States186 is the source usually cited as the origin of the characteristic risk test.187
Friendly noted that the doctrine of respondeat superior is based not on tort prin-
ciples, but rather on the "deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise can-
180 Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 362 (quoting Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 471 P.2d 988, 990
(Cal. 1970)).
181 As Mechem describes it, "the question is ... whether . at the time of the injury, [the
servant was] really engaged upon his master's business or his own." MECHEM, supra note 51, §
1895. See also id. § 1896 (noting the fundamental issue is whether "the business can fairly be
called the master's"); HENRY H. PERRiITr, JR., WORKPLACE TORTS: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES §
10.30 (1991) (stating that the important question is "was the actor engaged in the employer's
business or on a personal matter"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. a (1958)
("[T]he ultimate question is whether or not it is just that the loss resulting from the servant's
acts should be considered as one of the normal risks to be borne by the business in which the
servant is employed."); id. § 229 illus. 4, 5 (noting that the key question is whether the act
occurred during the performance of a part of the defendant's business).
182 See ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 171-72; KEETON ET AL., supra note 142, § 69 at 500; see
generally SLAIN ET AL., supra note 61, at Ch.II § 1; James, supra note 60, at 182.
183 The "engendered-by-the-employment test" is also sometimes described as an attempt to
determine whether the risk ought to be borne by the business. See Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 362.
184 The question focuses on the general class of injury, not on the specific incident. See Ira S.
Bushey & Sons, Inc., v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 1968); ATIYAH, supra note
58, at 172.
185 Cases applying foreseeability analysis include State v. Schallock, 941 P.2d 1275 (Ariz.
1997); Lisa M., 907 P.2d 358; Commerce Bank of St. Joseph, N.A. v. State, 833 P.2d 996 (Kan.
1992).
186 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
187 Fleming James strongly advocated the test, in exactly the same language used in Ira S.
Bushey & Sons, Inc., about a decade earlier. See James, supra note 60, at 175-77.
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not justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be
characteristic of its activities."' 88 Characteristic risks are those that are foresee-
able in a very specific sense: the ordinary operation of the business enterprise
increases the risk in question.' 89 Foreseeability in this context does not require
that the risk be avoidable with due care. 19° Rather, a risk is foreseeable if one
should perceive that harm is "likely to flow from [one's] long run activity in
spite of all reasonable precautions."' 9' This rule follows from the fact that the
foreseeability requirement is intended not to deter carelessness, but rather to
force the operator of an enterprise to include in her costs of doing business li-
ability for all the risks created by the business. 92 A determination of foresee-
ability thus requires an inquiry into what deviations from instructions might
"reasonably be expected on the part of servants similarly employed." 193 Al-
though Friendly's characteristic risk analysis was a new way of looking at the
scope of employment that has not been widely adopted in the courts, the Re-
statement includes foreseeability as a factor to be considered in determining
whether an act was within the scope of employment. 94 Also, Judge Friendly's
understanding of the fundamental principles of both respondeat superior and of
the scope of employment requirement are directly embodied in the Restate-
ment.'9
18s Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 398 F.2d at 171. One commentator has criticized Friendly's
characteristic risk theory on the ground that it has never been accepted "by the tort system as a
whole," Schwartz, supra note 52, at 1750, which was of course Friendly's point.
189 See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 398 F.2d at 171-72; HOLMES, supra note 57, at 75-76;
James, supra 60, at 175; Keating, supra note 62, at 1280, 1287-88.
190 See James, supra note 60, at 176; Keating, supra note 62, at 1288, 1295. In this respect,
Holmes had a different conception of foreseeability in mind. See HOLMES, supra note 57, at 76-
77 (noting that foreseeability permits a defendant to take precautions to avoid an accident).
191 James, supra note 60, at 176. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 230 cmt. b
(1958) (noting that the master must expect the servant to occasionally deviate from instruc-
tions); ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 172.
192 See ATIYAH, supra note 58, at 172, 263; HOLMES, supra note 57, at 127-28; James, supra
note 60, at 175. See also Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 50 F.3d 484, 490 (7th Cir. 1995). The
foreseeability requirement also solves some of the problems raised by general liability without
fault. Even Holmes, who criticized much of the law of agency for being contrary to common
sense, noted that, "according to the ordinary canons of legal responsibility," a man would be
liable when "he has induced the immediate wrong-doer to do acts of which the wrong, or, at
least, wrong, was the natural consequence under the circumstances known to the defendant."
Holmes, supra note 58, at 14. See also HOLMES, supra note 57, at 75-76; Schwartz, supra note
52, at 1747 (discussing Holmes's views on foreseeability in vicarious liability).
193 KEETON ET AL., supra note 142, § 70, at 504.
194 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. b (1958); id. § 231 cmt. a (noting
that criminal acts are often outside the scope of employment because they are unexpectable); id.
§ 245 cmts. a, c (noting that the liability of the principal will depend on the "likelihood of a
battery" in a given business, based on the kind of result to be accomplished, the customs of the
enterprise, the nature of the persons usually employed in the work, and human nature).
195 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161 cmt. a, § 229 cmt. a (1958).
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In sum, the scope of employment doctrine is intended to limit a princi-
pal's vicarious tort liability to those situations where the tort was an incident of
her business activity, rather than of ordinary life. The purpose-to-serve test, the
engendered-by-the-employment test, and the characteristic risk/foreseeability
test are all attempts to capture that notion, and each, if applied with the funda-
mental principle in mind, will usually lead to results that in fact coordinate tort
liability with the enterprise that created or materially enhanced the risk of harm.
The scope of employment doctrine thus advances the larger goal of agency law:
coordinating the risks and benefits of business enterprises.,
96
c. Conduct Outside the Scope of Employment:
Restatement § 219(2)
The Restatement provides one basis' 97 for vicarious tort liability where
the conduct giving rise to the tort did not occur within the scope of the servant's
employment: if "the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the princi-
pal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accom-
plishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation."' 98 The grammar of this
section has led to considerable confusion. In the Title VII cases, the Supreme
Court treated the second clause of the sentence as completely independent of the
first. In other words, the Court held that a master is liable for her servant's con-
duct outside the scope of employment if the servant was aided in accomplishing
the tort by the existence of the agency relation. 199 Such a rule would vastly ex-
pand vicarious tort liability, and would make the scope of employment require-
ment largely superfluous because in almost every case where the tort is within
the scope of employment the tortfeasor will have been aided in commission of
the tort by the agency relationship.
As the comment to Section 219(2) makes clear, however, the second
clause of the sentence is intended to be an alternative only to the second part of
the first clause, "there was reliance upon apparent authority." In other words, the
second situation in which a master may be liable under Section 219(2)(d) exists
where the servant purported to act or speak on behalf of the principal and he was
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relationship. 200
196 See SLAIN ET AL., supra note 61, Ch. II § 1; James, supra note 60, at 182.
197 Section 219(2) also provides that a master will be liable, even if the servant is acting
outside the scope of employment, if the master is herself at fault. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 219(2)(a)-(c) (1958). I do not include such liability within the category of vicari-
ous liability because it is based on general tort law, not agency law, principles. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. e (1958).
198 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
199 See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court's use of section
219(2)(d)).
200 Interestingly, the same concept is phrased slightly differently, and more clearly, in the
comment to section 228: "[A] master may be liable if a servant speaks or acts, purporting to do
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The examples given in the comment illustrate such situations: "where a tele-
graph operator sends a false message" or where the manager of a store cheats a
customer.20 1 In both cases, the commission of the tort involves both the fact of
the agency relationship and the fact that the servant was purportedly acting in
202his capacity as servant. Thus, in a situation where a servant is aided in the
commission of the tort by the existence of the agency relationship, but where the
commission of the tort does not involve the servant's capacity as a servant, there
should not be liability under Section 219(2)(d).2 °3 Such a rule supports the gen-
eral principle that a master should be liable for torts that are incidents of the
business, but not those that merely coincide with the operation of the business.
The basis of liability described in Section 219(2)(d) thus does not detract from
or conflict with the general principles of the scope of employment doctrine or of
vicarious tort liability generally.
III. VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
A. The Supreme Court's Title VII Decisions
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court set forth the rule2°4 for an
employer's vicarious liability for sexual harassment by supervisory employees
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.205 That rule provides that an
so on behalf of his principal, and there is reliance upon his apparent authority or he is aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 228 cmt. a (1958).
201 Id. § 219 cmt. e.
202 The analysis is somewhat complicated by the fact that, where there is no apparent author-
ity, as in the case where the store manager is acting for an undisclosed principal, the servant
cannot be said to have expressly "purported" to act for the principal. See id. Nevertheless, the
identification of the servant with the principal, or at least with the business, is an essential fea-
ture of the tort. Section 219(2)(d) is thus intended to apply to "speech torts," as discussed
above. See supra § II.B.5; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 cmt. e, § 237
cmt. c (noting applicability of rule to torts such as defamation).
203 For example, where the employee of an insurance company used company records to
identify persons with expensive jewelry and then robbed them, the insurance company would
not be vicariously liable for assault. Cf. Leafgreen v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d
275 (S.D. 1986). Of the many cases citing section 219(2)(d), almost all involve sexual harass-
ment. A few involve other sex torts, but only one, in which section 219(2)(d) was alleged to
apply to a shooting by an off-duty deputy sheriff whose job required him to carry his gun at all
times, concerned a tort not involving sex. See Graves v. Wayne County, 333 N.W.2d 740, 743
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (denying summary judgment). This suggests courts are using section
219(2)(d) to hold employers liable when a simplistic application of the purpose-to-serve test to
sex torts denies liability.
204 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
205 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. (1994)).
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employer will always be vicariously liable for harassment that involves a tangi-
ble employment action.2° In cases not involving a tangible employment action,
the employer will also be vicariously liable, but such liability is subject to an
affirmative defense that (a) "the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct ... harassing behavior," and (b) "the plaintiff employee unreasona-
bly failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities pro-
vided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise., 20 7 The reasoning by which
the Court reached this result is interesting, although misguided.
The Court began with basic agency principles, as directed by Congress
and Supreme Court precedent, 20 8 but in doing so the Court relied primarily on
lower Federal courts' analyses of the relevant agency law, despite the fact, rec-
ognized by the Court, that such analysis often failed to reflect actual agency
law. 209 The Court thus began, and ended, its analysis of agency law with Sec-
tion 219 of the Restatement. As described above,210 Section 219 sets out the
general rule that a master is vicariously liable only for torts committed within
the scope of employment, unless the master is herself at fault or unless the ser-
vant purported to act for the principal and was apparently authorized or was
aided in committing the tort by the existence of the agency relationship. The
Court observed that sexual harassment has generally been held, by the lower
Federal courts, to be outside the scope of employment because it is not moti-
vated by a purpose to serve the employer but rather by the personal impulses
and desires of the harasser.21 Although the Court acknowledged that there are
other tests for the scope of employment besides the purpose-to-serve test,212 it
did not conduct any analysis about the appropriateness of applying one test
rather than another. It also did not conduct its own analysis of whether sexual
harassment satisfies the purpose-to-serve test, other than to note that a harassing
supervisor "may not be actuated by a purpose to serve the employer. '21 3 The
206 See Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 762.
207 Id. at 765.
208 See id. at 754 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)). The Court
stated that "basic agency principles" means the "general common law of agency," as opposed to
actual state law. Id. at 754; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791-92.
209 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-96. The Court in Faragher discussed a rule adopted by
lower Federal courts in sexual harassment cases that where the harasser is sufficiently high up
in the organization, the employer will be vicariously liable because the harasser is the "organi-
zation's proxy." Id. at 789-90. Such a rule appears to have no basis in agency law, but it some-
what resembles the "vice-principal" exception to the fellow servant rule, described infra note
259.
210 See supra Part III.C.3.c.
211 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-94; Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 756-57.
212 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 794-96. The Court in Faragher also described the scope of
employment doctrine as a "bare formula" to cover decisions about the expediency of holding
the employer liable. Id. at 796 (citation omitted).
213 Id. at 756 (citation omitted); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 794 (noting that "courts have
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Faragher Court expressly rejected the Restatement scope of employment analy-
sis in favor of "an enquiry into the reasons that would support a conclusion that
harassing behavior ought to be held within the scope of a supervisor's employ-
ment., 214 Thus, the Court resorted to Section 219(2)(d) to find vicarious liabil-
ity,215 which it incorrectly read, as explained above,216 in the complete disjunc-
tive: either the employee purports to act for the principal and has apparent au-
thority, or the employee is aided by the agency relationship in accomplishing the
tort.217 Because apparent authority, according to the Court, applies only where
the employee "purports to exercise a power which he or she does not have," it is
generally irrelevant in the harassment context.21 8 So, an employer's vicarious
liability must rest on the fact that the harasser was aided by the agency relation-
ship. Such a rule, of course, is much too broad. Most workplace torts occur in
part because of the "[p]roximity and regular contact" of the workplace, which
provides "a captive pool of potential victims," and are therefore in some sense
aided by the agency relation. 2'9 But, having jettisoned all the carefully crafted
limitations on vicarious liability provided by the scope of employment require-
ment and the first part of Section 219(2)(d), the Court was left to create new
limitations on liability, which it proceeded to do based not on the policies of
agency law but on the policies of Title VII.
1. Tangible Employment Action
The Court divided sexual harassment into two categories: harassment
involving a tangible employment action and harassment involving a hostile
work environment. "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reas-
signment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits., 220 Harassment involving a tangible employment
action results in vicarious liability, according to the Court, because "the injury
emphasized that harassment... is motivated solely by individual desires and serves no purpose
of the employer").
214 524 U.S. at 797. The Court then rejected, however, a ruling based on the policy that
harassment is a cost of the employer's operation of the workplace, because Congress did not
indicate an intention to ignore the old agency scope of employment doctrines. Id. at 797-98.
215 The Court also noted that an employer might be liable for her own negligence under
section 219(2)(b). Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 758-59.
216 See supra Part III.C.3.c.
217 See Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 759.
218 See id. at 759-60; cf supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.5 (explaining the concept of apparent
authority).
219 Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 760 (citation omitted).
220 Id. at 761.
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could not have been inflicted absent the agency relation.,,221 Also, a tangible
employment action "requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act., 222
Thus, the tangible employment action "becomes for Title VII purposes the act of
the employer., 223 The Court reasoned that whatever else "aided by the agency
relation" may mean, it surely applies where a harassing supervisor takes a tangi-
ble employment action against a subordinate.224
Because the Court relied solely on Section 219, it failed to make the ob-
vious argument that a principal is vicariously liable for a tortious action that she
has actually authorized, and a tangible employment action must be actually au-
thorized to be effective.225 Such liability is based squarely in general agency
law, and exists whether or not the agent is a servant and whether or not the agent
is acting within the scope of employment. 226 Thus, despite having misunder-
stood the rule it did apply (Section 219(2)(d)), having mistakenly misapplied the
scope of employment principle by relying blindly on the purpose-to-serve test,
and having failed to apply the appropriate rule and principle about liability for
authorized acts, the Court reached the right conclusion that sexual harassment
involving a tangible employment action results in vicarious liability.
2. Hostile Environment
With respect to sexual harassment not involving a tangible employment
action,227 the Court applied a different analysis. Such harassment does not nec-
essarily depend upon the harasser's authority as a supervisor, although such
authority frequently "invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular
threatening character., 228 The Court focused on this feature of such harassment
because it had limited its analysis to the aided-by-the-agency-relation test. As
the Court noted, the aided-by-the-agency-relation test is not well-defined,229 and
is therefore not easy to apply in any given situation. The Court also noted that
221 Id. at 761-62.
222 Id. at 762.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 762-63; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790-91 (1998).
225 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 215 (1958) ("A master or other principal who
unintentionally authorizes conduct of a servant or other agent which constitutes a tort to a third
person is subject to liability to such person.").
226 Id. § 215 cmt. a.
227 Such harassment is sometimes designated "hostile work environment" harassment,
although the Court does not expressly adopt such terminology. Id.
228 Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 763.
229 The Court characterized the rule as a "developing feature" of agency law. Id. at 763. In
fact, it was almost never discussed or applied until it was picked up by the Federal courts in the
Title VII cases. See supra note 199.
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prior case law required that there be some limit on an employer's vicarious li-
ability for sexual harassment. 230 Left without a useful principle or body of case
law, and feeling free, in the Title VII context, to deviate from agency principles
if appropriate, 2 the Court turned to policy. The policy of Title VII is to deter
harassment, to encourage employers to adopt anti-harassment policies, and to
encourage establishment and use of internal grievance mechanisms.232 The
Court adopted its vicarious-liability-subject-to-affirmative-defense rule as a
response to such policies.233 The new rule would provide incentives to employ-
ers to prevent harassment and excuse them from liability if they took reasonable
steps to do so, a result that is completely contrary to agency law's insistence that
employers pay the costs of their employees' torts whether preventable or not.234
Thus, to the extent the Court was basing its analysis on agency law or princi-
ples,235 it failed utterly. Only by rejecting agency principles and adopting a rule
based solely on Congressional intent could the Court justify its holding.
3. The Thomas Dissent
Justice Thomas dissented from the Court's opinion and rejected the vi-
carious-liability-subject-to-affirmative-defense rule. He began, as did the major-
ity, with the assumption that creation of a hostile work environment is necessar-
ily outside the scope of employment, first, because it is "antithetical to the inter-
230 The Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986), argued that the
reference to "agents" in Title VII "surely evinces a [Congressional] intent to place some limits
on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible."
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792, 804.
231 Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 764.
232 Id.; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06. Such deterrence-based policies are quite different from
those of either general agency law or vicarious liability. See supra Part III.C.2.
233 The Court in Faragher noted that one of the advantages of the aided-by-the-agency-
relation test is that it is more likely to impose vicarious liability in cases of supervisor harass-
ment, where the employer has a "greater opportunity to guard against misconduct," than in
cases of co-worker harassment. 524 U.S. at 803.
234 See supra Parts II.C.2.a.ii and II.C.2.c.ii.
235 In Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 72 (1986), the Court, although declining to issue a
definitive rule on employer liability for sexual harassment, stated,
[W]e . . . agree with the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] that
Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this area.
While such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particu-
lars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent'
of an employer surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of em-
ployees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.
The Court in Burlington Industries, Inc. and Faragher interpreted this language to require that
agency principles be applied to the employer liability issue. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791-92;
Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 754.
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est of the employer,, 236 and second, because employers cannot prevent harass-
ment even with due care.237 Justice Thomas then correctly observed that Sec-
tion 219(2)(d) is not an all-encompassing aided-by-the-agency-relation test at
all, but is limited to cases where the employee purports to act for the em-
ployer.238 Thus, he concluded that there was no basis for finding an employer
239
vicariously liable for sexual harassment.
4. Conclusions
Had Burlington Industries and Faragher been decided strictly under Ti-
tle VII, applying employment discrimination principles and precedents and rely-
ing on statutory construction, the Court could have provided a coherent system
of liability. Unfortunately, however, the Court in both cases discussed and pur-
ported to apply general vicarious liability rules from the law of agency. In the
process, it failed to understand the principles of vicarious liability.24° By ignor-
ing the rich and complex scope of employment requirement, the Court failed to
consider, and consequently failed to advance, the underlying cost-allocation
principle of agency law. As I argue at greater length below, a full analysis of the
scope of employment requirement indicates that even hostile work environment
harassment may in some cases be within the scope of employment. Application
of the complex laws of agency to a complex set of social behaviors such as sex-
ual harassment requires a sophisticated understanding of both issues. Lacking
such an understanding, the Court was forced to resort to crude policy-based law-
making, thereby depriving both the law and the business community it serves of
a careful application of fundamental legal principles.
B. State Law Sexual Harassment and Assault Cases
Like the Supreme Court, courts applying state law considering vicarious
liability for sexual harassment frequently reach the wrong result as a result of
236 Burlington Indus.,Inc., 524 U.S. at 769 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This is, of course, a
misstatement and a misapplication of the purpose-to-serve rule, which does not require the tort
to have been in the interest of the master. Id.
237 Id. at 770 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Again, this is a misunderstanding of the principle of
vicarious liability, which holds employers liable not in spite of the fact that, but rather, because
they cannot prevent the tortious behavior. See supra Part III.C.2.c.ii.
238 Id. at 772 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
239 He concluded by arguing that sexual harassment is not a "freestanding federal tort," and
therefore should not subject an employer to vicarious liability. Id. at 774. In other words, the
vicarious liability scheme should not apply to sexual harassment at all.
240 Oddly enough, the Court created a rule perfectly consistent with German principles of
vicarious liability, which excuses an employer from vicarious tort liability if she can show she
was not negligent. See § 831 BGB.
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241
misunderstanding the law. In Michigan, for example, the court rejected em-
ployers' vicarious liability for hostile environment harassment because "the
supervisor acts outside 'the scope of actual or apparent authority to hire, fire,
discipline or promote.'
242
The more common issue in state courts is employers' vicarious liability
for sexual assaults by employees.243 Such cases were the setting for the Califor-
nia courts' refinement of the engendered-by-the-employment test for scope of
employment, pursuant to which an employer will be vicariously liable for an
employee's sexual assault only if the employment relationship has a causal
nexus with the impulse underlying the tort.244 Thus, where the employment re-
241 See Mackey v. Milam, 154 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying Faragher-type analysis to
sexual harassment claims under state law).
242 Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W. 2d 155, 169 n. 46 (Mich. 1993) (citation omitted). The court
went on to state, cryptically and without explanation, that "[c]orporate liability, therefore, exists
only through respondeat superior; liability exists where the corporate defendant knew or should
have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action against the supervi-
sor." Id. An example of both the underlying vicarious liability principle and the lack of under-
standing of that principle is provided by a recent case involving a law firm associate who, while
driving home one night, struck and killed a pedestrian. See Jennifer Myers, Suit Puts Law Firm
on the Line, LEGAL TIMES, June 25, 2001, at 1. The family of the victim sued the law firm-
employer for wrongful death, alleging that the associate was acting within the scope of her
employment because she was making business calls from her cell phone before, after, and
around the time of the accident. See id. If she was, in fact, conducting her employer's business
from her car at the time of the accident, and thus acting to benefit her employer and in further-
ance of its business, then she was acting within the scope of her employment. The fact, noted
by one attorney-commentator, that the firm did not "direct... her to make cell phone calls from
her car while driving [fifty] miles per hour," is no more relevant than the fact that a trucking
firm does not "direct" its drivers to exceed the speed limit. Id. (quoting Frank Winston Jr.).
Similarly, the plaintiffs would not, as another commentator stated, have to "prove that [the
associate's] phone calls were the proximate cause" of the death. Id. (quoting Richard Hikey).
The employer's liability is premised upon the fact that the employee, while acting within the
scope of employment, committed a tort (which of course must proximately cause injury to
result in liability). It is not necessary to prove that the employment caused the injury. The fact
that the employment gave rise to the tort is relevant to a determination whether the tortfeasor
was acting within the scope of employment, but the analysis is one of assessing whether the
employment increased the risk that the tort would occur, not one of proximate cause. See supra
Part III.C.3.b.ii.
243 See, e.g., Nazareth v. Herndon Ambulance Serv., 467 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990); Regions Bank & Trust,
N.A., v. Stone County Skilled Nursing Facility, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 916 (Ark. App. 2001); Lisa M.
v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp. 907 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1995); Mary M. v. City of Los Ange-
les, 814 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1991); John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948 (Cal.
1989); Brown v. Argenbright Sec., 782 A.2d 752 (D.C. 2001); Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So.
2d 994 (La. 1996); Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996); Fahrendorff v.
North Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1999); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio
1991); N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592 (Okla. 1999); Lourim v. Swensen,
977 P.2d 1157 (Or. 1999); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989); Thompson
v. The Everett Clinic, 860 P.2d 1054 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
244 See Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 365.
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quires the employee to become intimately involved with the victim, the em-
ployer might be subject to vicarious liability.245 Other courts, however, have
flatly rejected any suggestion that a sexual assault could be within the scope of
employment because such assaults are considered to be motivated by a purpose
to serve only the tortfeasor's carnal desires, and no purpose of the employer.
246
Similarly, in cases involving sexual assaults or molestation by church or youth
counselors, some courts have focused on the "personal" motives of the tortfea-
sors in denying vicarious liability,247 while at least one court has found such
assaults to be within the scope of employment. 248 In short, the state law of vi-
carious liability for sexual torts, while being more varied in both the tests used
and the results of application of those tests, is also fairly incoherent.
IV. VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A thorough understanding of the doctrine of vicarious liability is neces-
sary but not sufficient to determine whether employers should be vicariously
liable for sexual harassment. The presence or absence of vicarious liability in
most cases depends upon the determination of whether harassment is within the
scope of employment, and the tests for scope of employment depend upon an
understanding of the nature of the tort. Therefore, one must examine the nature
of sexual harassment as a tort249 before deciding whether an employer should be
245 See id. at 364.
246 See Primeaux v. United States, 181 F.3d 876, 882 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying South Dakota
law); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Utah 1989); Thompson v. Everett
Clinic, 860 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Wash. App. 1993); see also, e.g., Cooke v. Stefani Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., 250 F.3d 564, 569 (7th Cir. 2001) (arguing that "the supervisor directly perpetrated the
harassment through a series of rogue acts motivated by a desire to amuse himself, not benefit
his employer"); cf CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 83-92 (1979) (describing courts' treatment of sexual harassment
as "personal" or "natural" (and thus not discriminatory or work-related) as a reason for denying
liability under Title VII).
247 See Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); N. H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.),
998 P.2d 592 (Okla. 1999). Interestingly, the court in N. H. applied the purpose-to-serve test
despite the fact that the scope of employment rule in Oklahoma is a variation on the engen-
dered-by-the-employment relationship test. See Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd.,
867 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Okla. 1993).
248 See Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163 (Or. 1999) (applying a combination of the engen-
dered-by-the-relationship and purpose-to-serve tests to find that jury could find assault to be
"the culmination of a progressive series of actions" that originated in a motive to serve the
employer); Lourim v. Swensen, 977 P.2d 1157 (Or. 1999) (applying the same combination).
249 Although sexual harassment is not a common law tort, courts have generally treated it as
a tort for vicarious liability purposes. See Mackey v. Milam, 154 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 1998);
Arizona v. Schallock, 941 P.2d 1275 (Ariz. 1997). But see Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 774 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Popular misconceptions notwithstanding,
sexual harassment is not a freestanding federal tort, but a form of employment discrimina-
tion."); Chambers v. Trettco, Inc., (Mich. 2000) (treating harassment as a civil rights violation);
Cf MACKINNON, supra note 246, at 171 (arguing that "tort is conceptually inadequate to the
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vicariously liable.
A. Understanding Sexual Harassment
Most courts and legal commentators assume that sexual harassment, es-
pecially harassment that attempts to trade employment benefits for sexual fa-
vors, is motivated by the sexual desires of the harasser.25° Psychological studies
suggest, however, that harassment is a more complicated phenomenon.25'
1. Causes
Psychologists have developed several models attempting to explain the
causes of and aggravating factors for sexual harassment.252 One such model is
problem of sexual harassment to the extent that it rips injuries to women's sexuality out of the
context of women's social circumstances as a whole"). To the extent sexual harassment results
in an obligation not based on consent to be bound, it seems appropriate in light of general legal
principles to treat it as a tort. Id.
250 See Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV.
691, 698-701 (1997) (describing the "Biological" model, which understands harassment as the
natural result of a sexually integrated workplace).
251 Even if harassment is motivated by a desire for sex, it may be a more complicated
phenomenon than at first appears. Recent highly controversial literature suggests, for example,
that rape (and perhaps other sexual coercion) is a naturally occurring biological mating strategy,
arising in part from, although not consciously motivated by, the desire to procreate. See, e.g.,
Randy Thornhill & Craig T. Palmer, Why Men Rape, THE SCIENCES, Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 30; see
also Kimberly A. Tyler et al., Coercive Sexual Strategies, 13 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 47 (1998)
(examining various coercive "strategies" used by men in college); id. at 54 (noting a positive
correlation between men who had had sex in the past six months and those willing to use verbal
coercion and alcohol or drugs to obtain sex). Other scientists assert, however, that rape has its
origins in a violent desire to assert power and dominance and exercise control. See Just Why Do
Men Rape?, THE SCIENCES, May-June 2000, at 3 (collecting responses to Thornhill and
Palmer).
252 Some legal commentators have argued, with little or no empirical support, that sexual
harassment is a way to put women in their place by sexualizing and feminizing them. See
Franke, supra note 250, at 764; Elizabeth Grauerholz, Sexual Harassment in the Academy: The
Case of Women Professors, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: PERSPECTIVES,
FRONTIERS, AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES 29, 43 (Margaret S. Stockdale ed., 1996) [hereinafter
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE]. Harassment is said to be an attempt to "sexually
subordinate" female co-workers. See Franke, supra note 250, at 725-29 (discussing
MACKINNON, supra note 246, at 70); Jeanette N. Cleveland & Melinda E. Kerst, Sexual Har-
assment and Perceptions of Power: An Under-Articulated Relationship, 42 J. VOCATIONAL
BEHAV. 49, 54-58 (1993) (describing sexual harassment as a strategy to devalue women and
acquire or retain power). Although such an explanation probably resonates with many working
women, it has not been demonstrated by sociological or psychological study. MacKinnon notes
that sexual harassment of women in positions of power may be, in Gloria Steinem's prose,
"taming of the shrew syndrome," but that many, if not, most victims of sexual harassment are
perceived as powerless. See MACKINNON, supra note 246, at 253 n.55. Although MacKinnon
notes that powerlessness makes women vulnerable, she does not suggest that powerlessness
might be a causal factor in the harasser's decision to harass, because she focuses exclusively on
2002] 559
43
Dalley: All in a Day's Work: Employers' Vicarious Liability for Sexual Ha
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
the "Socio-Organizational" or "Person X Situation" model, which indicates that
men 253 who have a psychological tendency to harass (denominated in the litera-
ture as "high LSH" or "likely to sexually harass") 254 are more or less likely to
act on those tendencies based on the environment in which they work. 255 For
example, sexual harassment is more common in some organizational contexts
than in others. 56 Experimental and survey evidence shows that harassment is
more likely to occur when a man who is likely to harass is in a situation where
the local norms are favorable to harassment;257 for example, in sexualized envi-
258ronments, in environments where managers or other role models appear to
259tolerate or condone harassment, or in environments where a tolerant norm has
arisen from the spontaneous interaction of peers (for example, where there is a
large number of high LSH men or where a minority behaves consistently and
persistently in a given way).26° Other relevant environmental factors include the
rarity or token status of women in the workplace, the fact that women lack
power in the workplace hierarchy, and the general tolerance of non-professional
behavior. 261 Although the propensity of the harasser to harass is an important
causal factor, the presence of that factor alone far less frequently results in har-
assment than the presence of that factor in a conducive work environment. In
the experience of victims. She does, however, note that submissiveness is generally seen as an
attractive or erotic trait in women. See id. at 156-58. MacKinnon's argument, made before
sexual harassment was generally accepted as actionable under Title VII, is that sexual harass-
ment is employment discrimination that serves to oppress women as a group. See id. at 208-13.
Other commentators have suggested an explanation for harassment that takes the form of a
request for sex is that it is a way for high-status men to signal their sexual attractiveness, and
provides an opportunity for high-status women to signal their choosiness by rejecting such
advances. See Gertrude M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Status-Signaling and the Law, with
Particular Application to Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1069, 1081-83, 1093 (1999).
This theory suggests that sexual harassment may be offensive because it represents an implicit
assertion by the harasser that the victim is of low status. See id. at 1081-82. This theory is also
unsupported by empirical evidence.
253 The research focuses exclusively on men as harassers and women as victims.
254 See John B. Pryor et al., A Social Psychological Model for Predicting Sexual Harassment,
51 J. Soc. ISSUES 61, 74-78 (1995).
255 See Margaret S. Stockdale et al., The Sexual Harassment of Men: Evidence for a Broader
Theory of Sexual Harassment and Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOLOGY, PUB. POL'Y, & L. 630,
637 (1999).
256 See John B. Pryor et al., A Social Psychological Analysis of Sexual Harassment: The
Person/Situation Interaction, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 68, 69 (1993).
257 See id. at 69, 76-77.
258 See id. at 69.
259 See id. at 69-70, 73, 77.
260 See id. at 79.
261 See id. See also Experts on Sexual Harassment Prove Helpful to Title VII Plaintiffs, 59
U.S.L.W. 2527, 2528 (1991) (hereinafter Experts on Sexual Harassment).
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one experiment, men with high LSH scores engaged in sexually harassing be-
havior eighty-nine percent of the time when there was a harassing role model,
but only twenty-two percent of the time with a non-harassing role model.262 Ad-
ditionally, men who are psychologically likely to sexually harass are more likely
to do so when situations for sexual interaction present themselves, as, for exam-
ple, where a supervisor has occasion to peer closely over a subordinate's shoul-
der at a computer screen.263 This model, among others,2 4 seeks to explain the
phenomenon that harassment is more likely to occur in a workplace dominated
by men, especially where such dominance exists not only numerically but in
terms of the traditionally male-oriented nature of the work.265
The psychological characteristics underlying a likelihood to sexually
harass include a cognitive association between sex and power that also interacts
266
with the work environment. A cognitive association between sex and power
exists when the idea of power becomes habitually linked with the idea of sex in
the individual's mind.267 When a man with such a cognitive association is placed
in a supervisory position (in other words, a position of power) over a woman, he
is more likely to view her as sexually attractive.268 When asked about his behav-
ior, he will ascribe it to purely sexual motives, such as the woman's attractive-
ness or perceived receptivity to his advances, because he will not recognize that
his sexual thoughts have been primed by the power relationship. 69
262 See Pryor, supra note 256, at 77.
263 See Pryor, supra note 254, at 74-75.
264 See infra at notes 273-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Sex-Role Spillover
model); Fremling & Posner, supra note 252, at 1085 (1999) (arguing that men in traditionally
male jobs have their status bound up in the manliness of their work and therefore are more
likely to resent women integrating the workplace).
265 See Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Sexual Harassment in
Organizations: A Test of an Integrated Model, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 578, 586 (1997).
266 See John A. Bargh & Paula Raymond, The Naive Misuse of Power: Nonconscious
Sources of Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 85, 88-89 (1995).
267 See id. at 87.
268 See id. at 87-91; see also Frank E. Saal, Men's Misperceptions of Women's Interpersonal
Behaviors and Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note
252, at 67, 82 (noting that the data does not indicate that men who make unwelcome sexual
advances are misinterpreting women's behavior, and arguing that such men are instead reacting
to some feminizing characteristic such as powerlessness); MACKINNON, supra note 246, at 156-
58 (noting that powerlessness is generally viewed as an attractive trait in women).
269 See Bargh & Raymond, supra note 266, at 90; see also Franke, supra note 250, at 743
(stating that sexual harassment is "a way to express power, not desire"). But cf Fremling &
Posner, supra note 252, at 1088 (treating sexual harassment as the result of the attractiveness of
the victim). Fremling and Posner note that young women are more likely to be harassed than
middle-aged women. Id. at 1080 n.13 and accompanying text (citing DAVID M. Buss, THE
EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING 160 (1994)). Because youth tends to be
an indicator of both attractiveness and powerlessness, the fact that young women are more
likely to be harassed would support both the harassment-as-sex and the harassment-as-power
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The "Sex-Role Spillover" model suggests that harassment results from
the "carryover of gender-based expectations ... into the workplace.,, 270 Accord-
ing to this model, men harass women at work because they are incapable of
thinking of women in non-sexual terms.27 1 They may expect women to conform
to traditional female roles, such as mother, wife, or sex-object.272 This model
posits that harassment will be more likely to occur in workplaces where there
are substantially more men than women, because the women in such workplaces
will "stick out, '273 and where sexuality "thrives" for other reasons, such as an
274unprofessional ambience or a sexualized environment. A related model argues
that harassment represents a form of gender policing; that is, it is a way to en-
force traditional norms of gender behavior against those, such as women in tra-
ditionally male occupations or effeminate men, who deviate from those
norms.
27 5
2. Sexual Harassment, Workers' Compensation, and the Fellow
Servant Problem
A further unusual feature of sexual harassment is that, unlike most torts
for which employers may be vicariously liable, it is usually committed by one
employee against another. At common law, the fact that the tortfeasor and vic-
tim were both servants of the same master would have eliminated liability on the
part of the employer. 276 The modem law has largely abandoned this "fellow
servant" rule and replaced it with workers' compensation statutes.277 Workers'
compensation applies to any injury "arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment. 2 78 Generally, the scope of workers' compensation coverage is closely
hypotheses.
270 Stockdale et al., supra note 255, at 638.
271 See id.
272 See id.
273 See id.
274 See id.; see also Barbara A. Gutek, Sexual Harassment at Work: When an Organization
Fails to Respond, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 252, at 272, 285
(noting that harassment is more common in academic environments where sexual relationships
between teachers and students is the norm); Experts in Sexual Harassment, supra note 261, at
2528 (describing expert testimony noting four categories of preconditions that "enhance the
presence of stereotyping" in the workplace).
275 See Stockdale et al., supra note 255.
276 See KEETON, supra note 142, at 571-72. Some states recognized a "superior servant" or
"vice principal" exception for torts committed by supervisory employees, who were deemed to
be representing the master. See WILLIAM A. McKINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FELLOW
SERVANTS §§ 43, 70 (1890)
277 See KEETON, supra note 142, at 575-76.
278 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 3.01
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analogous to the scope of employment limitation in vicarious liability. An injury
occurring in the course of an activity is in the course of employment "if, in view
of the nature of the employment environment, the characteristics of human na-
ture, and the customs or practices of the particular employment, the activity is in
fact an inherent part of the conditions of the employment." 279 Most states also
require that an injury occur "by accident," which generally means that it is un-
expected, not that it is unintentional.28 ° Injuries arising from assaults, for exam-
ple, are treated like other injuries - they are covered if there is a causal link be-
tween the employment and the assault or if the employment creates an increased
risk of assault. 28' A few courts have held that sexual harassment is covered by
state workers' compensations statutes,282 and some of the considerations under-
lying the issue of whether sexual harassment should be covered by such statutes,
such as whether the injury occurred in the course of employment, are similar to
considerations relating to whether sexual harassment is within the scope of em-
ployment.283 Thus, the analysis described below might be useful in determining
whether sexual harassment should be compensable under workers' compensa-
tion statutes.
A few commentators have suggested that, because all the parties to a
sexual harassment claim are in contractual privity with one another, there might
be a market solution to the problem. For example, women working in environ-
ments where sexual harassment occurs could demand higher wages, and em-
ployers would be encouraged to prevent sexual harassment because of the in-
creased costs it imposes on their businesses. 284 This is, of course, a not particu-
285larly updated version of the fellow servant rule. Most commentators suggest-
ing that there might be a market solution for co-worker torts also acknowledge
(2000).
279 Id. at § 20.01.
280 See id. §§ 42.01, 42.02.
281 See id. § 8.01.
282 See Franke, supra note 250, at 700 n.26 (collecting authorities).
283 See id. For a general comparison of vicarious liability and workers' compensation
schemes, see Priest, supra note 92, at 478.
284 See Fremling & Posner, supra note 252, at 1088-91; Kathy Hanisch, An Integrated
Framework for Studying the Outcomes of Sexual Harassment: Consequences for Individuals
and Organizations, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 252, at 174. Such
increased costs include not only the higher wages female employees demand, but also potential
inefficiencies as a result of employees being promoted or sanctioned as a result of their re-
sponses to sexual overtures rather than based on merit or productivity, and lost productivity
from emotional injury and job dissatisfaction. See Fremling & Posner, supra note 252, at 1088-
91. See also Charles L. Hulin et al., Organizational Influences on Sexual Harassment, in
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 252, at 127, 145.
285 See MCKINNEY, supra note 246, § 4 (describing basis of fellow servant rule in concept of
free markets); id. § 10 (describing policy of rule arising from belief in free market and freedom
of contract).
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that imperfect information and other transaction costs may make such a solution
impracticable, and therefore ultimately adopt a vicarious liability analysis.s 6
Thus, the fact that sexual harassment occurs between employees of the same
employer should not matter for vicarious liability analysis.
B. Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment
Assuming there is a cause of action against the harasser for sexual har-
assment under Title VII, state statute or state common law, determining whether
the employer is vicariously liable is a matter of applying the usual agency law
analysis: the employer will be vicariously liable if the tort was committed by a
servant acting within the scope of his employment.287 Because applying the ser-
vant-independent contractor analysis to a sexual harasser does not raise any spe-
cial issues, the important issue in determining an employer's vicarious liability
for sexual harassment is likely to be whether the harassment was within the
scope of employment. As explained above, the definition of the scope of em-
ployment that most comports with the underlying agency principles is the risk-
of-the-enterprise test. However, because state courts vary in their definitions of
scope of employment, I will consider each test in turn.
1. Purpose to Serve
The Restatement purpose-to-serve test requires that the servant be act-
ing, at least in part, to serve the interests of the employer. The test is a subjective
one, and, as a result, application of the test must be made on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Plaintiffs and employers should be permitted to introduce evidence indicat-
ing the actuating force for the harassment. Although in some cases a harasser
286 See Fremling & Posner, supra note 252, at 1090-10; Keating, supra note 62, at 1296-
1308; Sykes, supra note 53, at 606.
287 One might also argue for employers' strict liability for sexual harassment by analogy to
the law of nondelegable duties. If an employer is under a duty to provide a safe environment or
otherwise protect the plaintiff, the employer will be liable even when the injury is caused by an
employee not acting in the scope of employment or by an independent contractor. See KEETON
ET AL., supra note 142, § 70. Nondelegable duties can arise from a special relationship (such as
acting as an innkeeper or common carrier) or when the employer has entrusted the employee
with a "dangerous instrumentality" (that is, "one involving a high degree of risk to others"). See
id.; see also MECHEM, supra note 51, § 1923. In the employment context, Title VII places a
duty upon covered employers to provide a workplace free of discrimination on the basis of sex.
One might argue that such a duty, akin to the duties of common carriers, cannot be avoided by
delegating it to employees. See James, supra note 60, at 203 (noting that "duties imposed by
statute" are often found to be nondelegable); EEOC v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 256 F.3d 516,
521-523 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that employer cannot escape liability for sexual harassment
under Title VII by entering into a collective bargaining agreement or by delegating firing deci-
sions to an arbitrator, and stating that "[o]nce the employer has been put on notice... it must
act to protect other employees and bear the consequences of failure.") Such a rule might be
said to better advance the policy goals of Title VII than the tortured rule adopted by the Su-
preme Court. See supra Part III.A.
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may be acting out of personal animosity or desire, in other cases the harasser
may misguidedly believe that his acts will advance the employer's interests by
drivin out female employees who are perceived to be incompetent or disrup-
tive.z88 Courts in the assault and battery cases have indicated, for example, that
incidents that arise from foreseeable workplace disputes may be "actuated by a
purpose to serve the master," even if the assault itself is not intended to advance
the employer's interests. If, as studies indicate, harassment is at least in part the
result of workplace interactions between men who are likely to sexually har-
ass 289 and women over whom they have power, it cannot be said, as a matter of
law, that sexual harassment is outside the scope of employment under the pur-
pose-to-serve analysis. Furthermore, because psychological studies suggest that
harassers do not accurately identify their own motives, applying the purpose-to-
serve test correctly will be even more difficult; this is, as stated above, one of
the reasons why the purpose-to-serve test is unsatisfactory.
290
2. Engendered by the Employment
The engendered by the employment test asks whether there was a causal
nexus between the employment relationship and the tort. The application of this
test to sexual harassment is simple, once harassment is properly understood.
Because men who are likely to sexually harass tend to do so only when they are
in an environment where harassment is tolerated, the data suggests that more
often than not harassment will in fact be causally related to the employment.
Furthermore, if, as the studies suggest, the likelihood to sexually harass is often
at least in part the result of the placement of a man with a cognitive association
between power and sex in a position of power over a woman, again the harass-
ment can be seen to be engendered by the employment. Just as the intimate rela-
tionship involved in psychological counseling may give rise to sexual im-
pulses,291 so the power relationship involved in many workplaces may give rise
to harassing impulses.
Furthermore, if, as commentators suggest, sexual harassment is used to
288 See Fremling & Posner, supra note 252, at 1084-85; Stockdale et al., supra note 255, at
643; BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 812-813
(3d ed. 1996); cf. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798-77 (1998) (discussing
hypothetical supervisor's firing minority workers to keep peace in the workplace).
289 See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968).,
quoting Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ("Men
do not discard their personal qualities when they go to work. Into the job they carry their intel-
ligence, skill, habits of care and rectitude. Just as inevitably they take along also their tenden-
cies to carelessness and camaraderie, as well as emotional make-up .... These expressions of
human nature are incidents inseparable from working together. They involve risks of injury and
these risks are inherent in the working environment.").
290 See supra Part II.C.3.b.i.
291 See Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 365 (Cal. 1995).
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accomplish sexist goals and enforce norms of gender behavior,292 a different
causal nexus may exist between harassment and the employment relationship.
For example, behavior motivated by a desire to drive women out of an inte-
grated workplace is directly caused by the nature of the workplace and the
work-related interactions that occur there. The California court stated that "a
sexual tort will not be considered engendered by the employment unless its mo-
tivating emotions were fairly attributable to work-related events or condi-
tions. 293 Research indicates that sexual harassment will usually satisfy this test.
3. Risk of the Enterprise
As described above, the risk-of-the-enterprise test asks whether the risk
of a particular injury is so characteristic of the enterprise that the enterprise
should bear that risk. The determination is based on the foreseeability of the risk
in light of the nature of the enterprise; in other words, does the ordinary opera-
tion of the enterprise increase the risk of the harm, and is the risk one that the
employer should perceive is "likely to flow from [her] long run activity. ' 294 The
test incorporates the fundamental principle of agency law that the risks of an
activity should be borne by the enterprise that receives the benefits of that activ-
ity.
Here again, the application to sexual harassment is relatively simple
once harassment is properly understood. At a high level of generality, enter-
prises derive enormous benefits from the use of employees and from the delega-
tion of authority to those employees. The existence of supervisory relationships,
the discretion given to supervisors, and the creation of decentralized workforces
and close working relationships all benefit the employer,295 and the risks-and-
benefits-of-the-business theory dictates that the employer should bear the losses
that arise from those characteristics of the business. More specifically, research
indicates that the incidence of and risk of harm from sexual harassment is di-
rectly correlated to certain kinds of business decisions about the operation of the
workplace made by the employer: Men who are psychologically likely to harass
are more likely to act on that tendency when their workplaces and superiors are
tolerant of sexual harassment, and the impact on the victims of harassment is
higher in such workplaces.296
292 See Franke, supra note 250, at 693; Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are,
Who Women Should Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimina-
tion, 5 PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND LAW 665, 668-77 (1999); Saal, supra note 268, at 68.
293 Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 364.
294 See supra note 189.
295 See Fremling & Posner, supra note 252, at 1098-01; cf. Schwartz, supra note 52, at 1764-
67 (arguing that employers do not seek indemnification from employees who commit torts is
because they want to encourage vigorous decision-making and risk-taking).
296 See Stockdale et al., supra note 255, at 640; supra Part VI.A. 1.
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The existence of a climate of tolerance is a matter of perception by ha-
rassers and victims which will not necessarily coincide with the absence of har-
assment-prevention policies. Rather, organizational culture is a complex, still
not fully understood web of shared perceptions of "contingencies between spe-
cific behaviors and their consequences, both private and public, positive and
negative., 297 Thus, even if the Supreme Court's Faragher - Burlington Indus-
tries affirmative defense were intended to capture the idea of a tolerant organ-
izational climate in an effort to determine whether the harassment occurred
within the scope of employment,298 it would fail to do so because it is based
only on the employer's direct efforts at prevention and correction and does not
take into consideration the myriad indirect decisions and attitudes that in fact
encourage or deter harassing behavior.
For example, one commentator has noted the following factors contrib-
uting to the incidence of and damage from sexual harassment in one case study:
(a) the attitudes of the individuals to whom the incidents were first reported;
(b) the "lack of clearly specified human resources responsibilities" in the organ-
izational structure; (c) the "lack of clearly defined role relationships among or-
ganizational members, ' 299 which, combined with unequal levels of power, lead
to lines of authority being "overlooked or minimized"; and (d) "facilitating con-
ditions", such as the distribution of men and women in employment roles and a
workplace norm tolerant of sexual relationships between people of unequal
status. °° Of these, only the second, the organization of the human resources
department, would be relevant to Faragher-Burlington Industries affirmative
defense analysis. But all these factors reflect decisions about the operation of the
business, and the risks-of-the-enterprise test requires that the risk of harassment
that such decisions create be borne by the enterprise which presumably benefits
from those decisions.3°'
297 Hulin et al., supra note 284, at 133.
298 The Title VII rule is not so designed; rather, it is intended to effectuate Title VII's
deterrence policies. See supra Part III.A.
299 The case study involved a music college, and individuals often served several functions:
Students were often also employees, and faculty and students were often equal participants in
musical activities that brought them together in the evenings. See Gutek, supra note 274, at
284.
300 Id. at 284-85. Other commentators have argued that sexualized work environments and
environments in which employees feel that sexual behavior among their coworkers is none of
their business lead to ethical climates in which harassment is encouraged or tolerated. See Lynn
Bowes-Sperry & Gary N. Powell, Sexual Harassment as a Moral Issue: An Ethical Decision-
Making Perspective, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 252, at 105, 115
(citing J. B. Pryor et al., A Social Psychological Analysis of Sexual Harassment: The Per-
son/Situation Interaction, 42 J. OF VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 68 (1993) and E. Haavio-Mannila et
al., The Effect of Sex Composition of the Workplace on Friendship, Romance, and Sex at Work,
in 3 WOMEN AND WORK 123 (B. A. Gutek et al., eds., 1988)); id. at 121.
301 For a recognition of this principle in a Title VII sexual harassment action, see EEOC v.
Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 256 F.3d 516, 525 (7th Cir. 2001) (en banc), which stated that, in making
reasonable workplace decisions, "[a] firm may consider those vicissitudes that the human con-
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The characterization of sexual harassment as a risk of the enterprise
should not, however, depend on the introduction of evidence indicating that the
enterprise consciously adopted policies that increased that risk. The risk-of-the-
enterprise test asks only whether the risk is one that the employer should expect
to result from her long-term operation of the business. Nevertheless, the nature
of the business is relevant to the analysis, and whether any particular case of
sexual harassment is within the scope of employment must be judged based on
the enterprise in question. A court considering the question should inform itself
of the circumstances that have generally been found to increase sexual harass-
ment and inquire into the nature of the enterprise. Sexual harassment is likely to
be foreseeable in enterprises with male-dominated work environments, for ex-
ample, for the same reason that property damage caused by drunken employees
is foreseeable in the Coast Guard. 30 2 When work-related disputes flare into vio-
lence, the risk-of-the-enterprise test holds the employer liable if such disputes
are foreseeable in the operation of the business. The analysis for incidents of
sexual harassment should be no different.30 3
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of vicarious liability is one of many agency law doctrines
intended to accomplish one of the principal goals of agency law: coordinating
the risks and benefits of business enterprises. That basic principle informs both
the independent contractor exception, which eliminates a principal's vicarious
liability for torts committed by agents not truly employed in her business, and
the scope of employment requirement, which limits vicarious liability to acts
that foreseeably arise in the operation of the business. Courts generally agree
that agency law principles should be applied to determine whether employers
are vicariously liable for sexual harassment under Title VH or state law. This
means, first, that courts must understand the relevant agency doctrines and prin-
ciples, and second, that they must inquire at least as deeply into the origin of an
incident of sexual harassment as a tort as they do into the origin of an assault. A
rote application of an overly-simplified purpose-to-serve test to determine that
harassment is necessarily outside the scope of employment applies the wrong
law to the wrong facts.304 Although the Supreme Court's Title VII rulings have
dition presents to any thoughtful employer. But it may not justify its actions as reasonable in
the light of avoidable costs created or increased by its own decisions."
302 See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1968).
303 A single rule declaring that sexual harassment is or is not within the scope of employment
as a matter of law in all cases would help to conserve judicial resources but would unfortu-
nately be contrary to the basic principles of agency law and torts, which require that liability be
determined based on the facts of each case.
304 For a particularly egregious example of this, see LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note
288, at 812:
At common law, an employer was liable for the torts of a servant corn-
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effectively ensconced incorrect rules and analysis in the Federal law, the states
continue to have the opportunity to get the law right and apply that law cor-
rectly, in the context of sexual harassment, sexual assault, or other intentional
torts.
305
mitted within the scope of the servant's employment. Under that rule,
an employer will be liable for harassing conduct that is within the
scope of the supervisor's actual authority. Hostile environment sexual
harassment normally does not trigger respondeat superior liability be-
cause sexual harassment rarely, if ever, is among the official duties of a
supervisor.
305 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 245 cmt. a (1958) (stating that whether an
intentional tort is within the scope of employment "depends upon the likelihood of a battery or
other tort in view of the kind of result to be accomplished, the customs of the enterprise and the
nature of the persons normally employed for doing the work").
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